

Life Insurance Convexity*

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Abstract

Life insurers sell savings contracts with surrender options, which allow policyholders to prematurely receive guaranteed surrender values. These surrender options move toward the money when interest rates rise. Hence, higher interest rates raise surrender rates, as we document empirically by exploiting plausibly exogenous variation in monetary policy. Using a calibrated model, we examine the impact of surrender options on insurers' liquidity and portfolio rebalancing during an interest rate rise. We show how asset sales result from insurer balance sheet dynamics and explore their interaction with investment strategies and surrender value guarantees.

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Abstract

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1 Introduction

Life insurers are significant financial intermediaries, as they hold 20% of outstanding bonds (IMF, 2021) and their products account for more than 20% of households' assets.¹ An important role of life insurers is to facilitate household saving by offering long-term savings contracts. These contracts typically entail surrender options, which allow policyholders to terminate a contract before its maturity and receive an ex ante guaranteed redemption value, termed *surrender value*.² When market interest rates rise, surrender options move toward the money. This paper quantifies the resulting effects on the life insurance sector's balance sheet and spillovers to financial markets.

First, we provide empirical evidence that higher interest rates lead to higher life insurance surrender rates. Thus, surrender options contribute to the *convexity* of life insurance contracts; their duration declines with higher interest rates. Second, we develop a quantitative model of life insurer cash flows. The calibrated model implies that a sustained 25 bps annual interest rate rise leads insurers to sell about 1 to 2% of their assets annually. Because insurers are major bond market investors, these asset sales can significantly affect asset prices: by up to 70 bps in our model. Third, we use counterfactual calibrations to explore determinants of forced asset sales and highlight the impact of asset-liability duration matching on the timing and allocation of asset sales across bond maturities.

Policymakers have recently started to consider the liquidity risk driven by surrender

¹Life insurance and annuities account for 14.8% and 5.1% of U.S. households' assets, respectively (*Source: U.S. Census Wealth and Asset Ownership for Households: 2018*). Life insurance and pension funds account for more than 30% of European households' financial assets (*Source: ECB Statistical Data Warehouse*).

²"Surrender" refers to both full as well as partial terminations of insurance contracts. It is closely related to contract lapses. Lapses are contract terminations upon policyholders' failure to pay premiums, whereas surrenders typically refer to active terminations in exchange for a positive surrender value.

options, focusing on risks related to increasing interest rates (e.g., [ECB, 2017](#); [EIOPA, 2019](#); [NAIC, 2021](#)).³ For example, in early 2023, the Italian life insurer *Eurovita* was placed under special administration by its supervisor, who suspended surrender payments after rising interest rates heightened surrender risk ([Fitch Wire, 2023a](#)). Despite increasing regulatory attention, academic research on liquidity risk in life insurance is limited.

Three motivating facts emphasize the importance of surrender-driven liquidity risk and asset sales. First, surrender payouts are economically significant. European life insurers paid EUR 362 billion in surrender benefits in 2019, amounting to over 40% of their premium income. Second, insurers are major investors, holding roughly 20% of outstanding euro-area bonds ([ECB, 2022](#)). Given the importance of bond prices for economic activity ([Gilchrist and Zakrajšek, 2012](#); [Kubitza, 2025](#)), it is thus important to understand the determinants of insurers' investment behavior. In the hypothetical case that European insurers financed the 2019 surrender payouts entirely by selling assets, the price impact would be 3.6% ($= 362/10,000$) when assuming a 10 bps decline per EUR 10 billion sold ([Greenwood et al., 2015](#)). Thus, surrender-driven asset sales have the potential to significantly affect financial markets and, hence, financial stability, especially since surrender risk correlates with the financial cycle. Third, we present anecdotal evidence from historical episodes in which interest rate hikes have drained life insurers' liquidity.

To explore the impact of surrenders on life insurers' liquidity risk and asset sales, we use the German life insurance market as a laboratory. German life insurance reserves amount

³Mario Draghi, then President of the European Central Bank, emphasizes in his introductory statement to the European Parliament on November 26, 2018, that "[...] *there might be times when policyholders want to terminate their insurance policies in large numbers, thereby putting liquidity strain on insurers. Authorities should be able to protect financial markets [...] from the adverse impact of such an exceptional run on insurers.*". Following policymakers, we focus on surrenders and their impact on life insurers' free cash flow as a main determinant of their liquidity risk.

to more than EUR 1 trillion, corresponding to roughly one third of German GDP. Most reserves are in participating contracts, whose cash an insurer invests in a single portfolio of assets and which, by regulation, include surrender options with ex ante guaranteed surrender values. On the one hand, rising interest rates reduce the market value of insurers' asset portfolios, which primarily consist of long-duration fixed-income securities, while leaving contractually guaranteed surrender values unchanged. This increases surrender incentives for policyholders. On the other hand, higher rates also increase insurers' reinvestment yields, increasing the expected returns on insurance contracts. The net effect of these opposing channels remains an empirical question.

We combine printed and digital records of the German supervisor to construct a panel of annual insurer-level surrender rates covering all German life insurers since 1996. We estimate that a 1 percentage point (ppt) increase in the 10-year German government bond rate is associated with a 25 basis point (bps) increase in surrender rates, controlling for macro-economic conditions. This economic magnitude is significant and implies that a one-standard deviation increase in interest rates corresponds to approximately EUR 2.2 billion in additional surrender payouts in the German life insurance sector. Whereas the positive correlation between surrender and market interest rates is well-documented (e.g., [Kojen et al., 2024](#)), it may be biased by omitted macroeconomic factors as well as by the impact of surrenders on insurers' investment behavior.

We address these concerns in two steps. First, we focus on the economic mechanism by exploring the interaction between interest rates and the guaranteed minimum return on life insurance contracts. The larger the guaranteed return, the less interest-rate sensitive are surrender incentives. Accordingly, we find that the correlation between surrender and

interest rates significantly weakens with larger guarantees. Second, we strengthen the causal identification by exploiting U.S. monetary policy surprises as an instrumental variable (IV) for German government bond rates. Monetary policy surprises, defined as rate changes in a short time window around monetary policy events, isolate unexpected variation in monetary policy from economic fundamentals (Gertler and Karadi, 2015; Jarocinski and Karadi, 2020). This empirical approach mitigates both omitted variable bias and reverse causality since German life insurers hold very little U.S. Treasuries. The IV estimates are quantitatively similar to the OLS estimates, lending support to a causal interpretation.

Armed with this empirical evidence, the second part of this paper quantifies the risk of surrender-driven asset sales during an interest rate rise. For this purpose, we develop a structural model of surrender decisions, which we embed in a quantitative model with a dynamic, stochastic financial market and a representative life insurer’s cash flows. Our calibration accounts for insurers’ legacy business and the detailed composition of their investment portfolios, which is important to appropriately capture cash flow dynamics.

We simulate paths with a length of 10 years, among which we select the 5% with the strongest interest rate rise. The average annual change in the 10-year interest rate among these paths is 25 bps, which corresponds to the 75th percentile of annual changes in German long-term rates from 1980 to 2019. In our model, rising interest rates drive up surrender rates from below 4% to 6%. The associated surrender payments drain the insurer’s free cash flow. This effect is offset by higher coupon payments on bond investments if the insurer adopts a duration matching strategy and, thus, accommodates a declining duration of liabilities by reducing the duration of asset investments. Rebalancing the portfolio toward short-term assets implies selling long-term assets. Total sales reach close to 2% of total invested assets

in our model. Using counterfactual calibrations with interest-rate-*insensitive* surrenders, we find that surging surrender rates account for the majority of these asset sales.

Due to the systematic nature of an interest rate rise, it affects the aggregate life insurance sector. To approximate the resulting price pressure, we scale our model to the size of European life insurance reserves with similar characteristics, which account for more than half of the market. Following Greenwood et al. (2015) in calibrating the price impact, we estimate that surrender-driven asset sales reduce asset prices by up to 30 bps. This magnitude is plausible compared to empirical studies of fire sales, and it is economically significant.

In counterfactual calibrations, we explore the sensitivity of our results. We find that the initial duration of asset investments is an important determinant of surrenders. A long duration isolates the book-value investment return and, hence, also the policyholders' contract return from interest rate changes. Therefore, when portfolio weights are fixed, surrender rates are higher than in our baseline calibration, in which the insurer follows a duration matching strategy. Whereas the total volume of asset sales remains comparable, their composition significantly differs. With duration matching, the sales of long-term assets raise long-term yields. Instead, with fixed portfolio weights (at market values), short-term bonds are sold to offset the relatively larger decline of long-term bond prices. Thus, insurers' investment strategies have important consequences for the impact of surrender-driven asset sales on the slope of the yield curve.

Our results provide new insights for monetary policy and systemic risk of non-bank intermediaries. We show that market value adjustments of surrender values can mitigate asset sales if insurers keep portfolio weights fixed, but not in the case of duration matching. We also discuss how market value adjustments compare with other policy tools, such as

surrender penalties and the suspension of surrender payouts.

The literature on liquidity risk of financial intermediaries has traditionally focused on banks (starting with [Diamond and Dybvig, 1982](#)) and, more recently, mutual funds ([Goldstein et al., 2017](#)). Whereas the surrender options embedded in most life insurance contracts resemble withdrawal options of deposit contracts, life insurers differ from other financial institutions in many aspects, such as their regulation and offering of long-term guarantees ([Kojien and Yogo, 2022](#); [Ellul et al., 2022](#)). The significant size of life insurers and their pivotal role in fixed-income markets ([Kojien and Yogo, 2023](#)) warrant a detailed understanding of their funding structure. However, while a growing literature examines insurers’ investment behavior ([Becker and Ivashina, 2015](#); [Girardi et al., 2021](#); [Becker et al., 2022](#); [Jansen, 2024](#)) and funding structure ([Chodorow-Reich et al., 2020](#); [Foley-Fisher et al., 2020](#); [Coppola, 2022](#); [Knox and Sørensen, 2023](#)), research on liquidity risk in life insurance is scarce.

In theory, surrender options move toward the money when interest rates increase ([Albizzati and Geman, 1994](#); [Chang and Schmeiser, 2022](#)).⁴ Additionally, strategic complementarities in surrender options may result in “mass surrenders” in response to particularly severe interest rate hikes ([Förstemann, 2021](#)). We complement existing studies by quantifying the effects of gradually rising interest rates in an empirically calibrated, dynamic model of insurer cash flows and with surrenders driven by fundamentals.

Consistent with life insurance convexity, prior studies document a positive correlation between interest and surrender rates ([Kuo et al., 2003](#); [Eling and Kiesenbauer, 2014](#); [Kojien et al., 2024](#)).⁵ However, these estimates may be confounded by omitted variables and by the

⁴Insurers may also profit from offering surrender options because of policyholders’ behavioral biases ([Nolte and Schneider, 2017](#); [Gottlieb and Smetters, 2021](#)).

⁵[Ozdagli and Wang \(2020\)](#) document that the duration of life insurers’ asset investments decreases with higher interest rates and argue that this relationship is driven by the interest rate sensitivity of surrenders.

impact of surrenders on insurers’ investment behavior. We contribute to this literature by offering evidence for a *causal* impact of interest rates on surrender rates.

The surrender-driven interest rate convexity in life insurance resembles the prepayment-driven convexity in fixed-rate mortgages (Chernov et al., 2018; Boyarchenko et al., 2019; Diep et al., 2021). An increase in long-term interest rates makes prepayments less favorable and, thereby, increases the duration of mortgage-backed securities (Hanson, 2014). Thus, convexity in mortgages is reversed to that in life insurance, which is an important insight for understanding the allocation of interest rate risk in the financial system.

Our paper also relates to recent studies about the role of long-term asset investments, e.g., in facilitating risk sharing (Hombert et al., 2021; Hombert and Lyonnet, 2022) and riding out short-term market fluctuations (Timmer, 2018; Chodorow-Reich et al., 2020). Our results suggest that long-term investments can *increase* liquidity risk as they fuel surrender-driven asset sales when interest rates rise.

Furthermore, we contribute to studies on fire sales in financial markets (e.g., Ellul et al., 2011; Greenwood et al., 2015; Lu et al., 2017). The most closely related paper is Ellul et al. (2022), who present a model in which insurers replenish their capital ratios by selling risky bonds after exogenous income shocks. Instead, in our model, insurers sell assets to match the duration of their assets and liabilities and to finance surrender payments.

2 Institutional Background

Savings and annuity contracts dominate the life insurance business, accounting for three quarters of all life insurance contracts in Germany (GDV, 2020). At retirement, policy-

holders can convert savings and annuity contracts into a lump sum payout or a stream of annuity payments. Before retirement, policyholders typically pay periodic premiums, which are invested by the insurer. In Europe, more than 60% of life insurance reserves are for *participating contracts*, whose cash is invested by the insurer in a joint portfolio.⁶

Surrender options, which allow policyholders to terminate a contract before maturity, are included in the majority of contracts, accounting for 88% of European life insurance reserves (EIOPA, 2019). In many cases, the associated surrender value is guaranteed, especially among participating contracts. The overall share of European life insurance contracts with surrender guarantees is thus substantial and corresponds to close to 60% of reserves (EUR 5 trillion in 2019).⁷

Within Europe, the provision of surrender guarantees is especially pronounced in Germany, where they apply to nearly 90% of savings and annuity reserves (GDV, 2020). The reason is that the vast majority of German life insurance contracts are participating contracts (88% of reserves in 2019). Regulation mandates these contracts to offer a guaranteed surrender value equal to the accumulated cash value (i.e., book value) less administrative costs (German Insurance Contract Law, Section 169). Moreover, since German insurers guarantee a minimum annual return on policyholders' savings, surrender values are bounded from below at contract origination already.

⁶Throughout the paper, we use data on the balance sheet of German and European insurers based on European Solvency II reporting at the single insurer (solo) level at quarterly frequency, downloaded from EIOPA's website in September 2020 (<http://eiopa.europa.eu/>). The U.S. life insurance market exhibits a stronger focus on nonparticipating policies, which allow policyholders to choose investment strategies (Kojen and Yogo, 2022). We discuss surrender options in U.S. life insurance in Internet Appendix A.

⁷Among participating contracts with surrender option, the surrender value is almost always guaranteed (for 91% of corresponding reserves), while guaranteed surrender values are less common among nonparticipating contracts with surrender option (23% of corresponding reserves) (EIOPA, 2019, Table 3). Using that the share of participating contracts is 63% in 2019, the share of European life insurance reserves with guaranteed surrender value is $58\% = 88\% \cdot (91\% \cdot 63\% + 23\% \cdot 37\%)$.

Total surrender payouts in 2019 were EUR 362 billion in the European Economic Area, of which EUR 21.5 billion were in Germany. Surrender payouts comprise almost half of insurers’ cash outflows, as they correspond to 44% of all life insurance payouts. The relative size of surrender payouts is similar when comparing them to total premiums, which are insurers’ main cash inflows. Even when accounting for other cash flows (insurers’ investment income, insurance benefits, and expenses), surrender payouts remain a significant share of the resulting net cash flow, for example, 24% in Germany.⁸ Thus, surrender payouts are a significant determinant of life insurers’ liquidity.

In Internet Appendix B, we describe three historical episodes, during which surrender rates sharply responded to rising interest rates and significantly drained life insurers’ liquidity. More recently, since euro-area interest rates started to rise significantly in 2022, life insurers are facing large increases in surrender payouts, “highlighting a significant change in customer behavior” (Fitch Wire, 2023b). In the case of the Italian life insurer *Eurovita*, the associated capital shortfall led to supervisory interventions and, in particular, the temporary suspension of policyholders’ surrender rights (Fitch Wire, 2023a).

Policyholders face relatively low costs of surrender. For example, only 17% of European life insurance reserves carry surrender penalties (EIOPA, 2019), and less than 10% impose surrender penalties of 15% or more (ESRB, 2015). According to anecdotal information from life insurers, surrender penalties in Germany are particularly small (in the range of 2.5% of surrender values) since they are supposed to only cover administrative expenses.

⁸We compute the surrender payouts of German life insurers relative to the sum of premiums and investment income net of insurance benefits and expenses in 2019, using reports by the German Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin) available at https://www.bafin.de/DE/PublikationenDaten/Statistiken/Erstversicherung/erstversicherung_artikel.html.

3 Empirical Analysis

This section provides empirical evidence that higher market interest rates lead to higher life insurance surrender rates.

3.1 Data and Empirical Strategy

We use the German life insurance market as an empirical laboratory. German life insurers hold more than EUR 1 trillion in life insurance reserves, corresponding to roughly one third of German GDP. Long-term savings contracts with guaranteed surrender values dominate the German life insurance market, as we document in the previous section.


We build our data sample based on the annual insurer-level report *Erstversicherungsstatistik* (i.e., *statistics on primary insurance*) published by BaFin, the German financial supervisory authority. This data set allows us to observe for each German life insurer its surrender rate and volume of insurance business (excluding non-life and reinsurance business). We digitize the data starting in 1995 until 2010, which are available only in print or pdf format. Since a common identifier for insurers is missing in the data, we match insurers by hand over time, resulting in a survivorship-bias-free panel from 1995 to 2019. The panel structure allows us to include insurer fixed effects in regressions, controlling for time-invariant insurer characteristics.

From the *Erstversicherungsstatistik*, we construct two variables. First, we define an insurer’s annual surrender rate as the fraction of life insurance contracts surrendered weighted by the volume of insurance in force. This variable is reported since 2016, while prior to

2016 we construct it from surrender rates separately reported for new and existing business (as described in Internet Appendix C.1). Second, we compute the share of new insurance business (by volume) relative to the previous year-end’s existing business.

Figure 1. Sample Characteristics and Visual Inspection of Surrender and Interest Rates.

Figure (a) depicts total annual insurance premiums and the volume of new business in billion EUR (left axis) and the number of insurers in each year (right axis) in the sample. New business is measured by volume insured and, thus, exceeds premiums paid. Figure (b) represents a binscatter plot of surrender rates and the lagged 10-year German government bond rate. For each realization of the 10-year German government bond rate, the conditional mean of insurer-level surrender rates is plotted as a scatter point. The figure also includes the line of best fit from a univariate OLS regression.



(a) Sample Size and Dynamics.

(b) Binscatter Plot of Surrender Rates and Interest Rates.

Due to the reconstruction of surrender rates in early years, the final sample starts in 1996. We winsorize insurer-level variables at the 2% and 98% levels to reduce the impact of outliers. The sample comprises 160 life insurers and accounts for EUR 71 billion in insurance premiums in an average year. Aggregate life insurance market dynamics are relatively stable over time (see Figure 1 a). The average surrender rate is 4.8% and varies widely across insurers and years, from 1.7% to 9.6% at the 5th and 95th percentiles, respectively (see Table 1).

The main explanatory variable in our regressions is the previous year’s market interest rate. We use the annualized yield of German government bonds with a residual maturity

of 10 years since it is a widely used benchmark and available with a long history. We lag government bond rates by one year because policyholders may not immediately react to changes in market conditions. The interest rate varies significantly in our sample and ranges from 0.4% to 6.3% at the 5th and 95th percentiles, respectively. The baseline empirical model for an insurer i 's surrender rate in year t is

$$\text{Surrender rate}_{i,t} = \alpha \text{Interest rate}_{t-1} + \beta \text{New business}_{i,t-1} + \xi Y_{t-1} + u_i + \varepsilon_{i,t}, \quad (1)$$

where $\text{Interest rate}_{t-1}$ is the lagged 10-year German government bond rate, Y_{t-1} is a vector of lagged control variables that capture macroeconomic conditions and insurance market dynamics, and u_i are insurer fixed effects. α estimates the effect of interest rates on surrender rates.⁹ Our hypothesis is that higher market interest rates increase surrender rates since they move surrender options toward the money, implying that $\alpha > 0$. An increase in market interest rates makes it relatively more attractive to surrender and invest ex-ante guaranteed surrender payments in alternative investment products (e.g., corporate or government bonds) to earn a higher return or use them as substitutes for other financing sources, such as mortgages. Consistent with the hypothesis and the specification of the empirical model in Equation (1), the binscatter plot in Figure 1 (b) shows a linear relationship between surrender rates and interest rates.

The Erstversicherungsstatistik does not provide information at the contract but only at the insurer level, with only few insurer-level control variables available. In particular, we

⁹We cluster standard errors at the insurer level to account for time-series dependence of residuals. All results also hold when we additionally cluster at the year level; however, we do not use these in the baseline results because the number of clusters may not be sufficient for convergence.

do not observe the share of surrenderable contracts, which biases the coefficient α downwards. We control for variation in contract characteristics and insurance market dynamics by including the lagged share of new business at the insurer level (obtained from the Erstversicherungsstatistik), $\text{New business}_{i,t-1}$, as well as the logarithm of the lagged number of new German life insurance contracts, $\log(\text{New German contracts}_{t-1})$, and, among these, the share of new term life contracts, $\text{New term life}_{t-1}$, as control variables (both made available to us by the German association of insurers (GDV)).

Identifying α in Equation (1) is challenging. Omitted variables might simultaneously affect interest rates and surrender rates. To alleviate this concern, as a first step, we control for the macroeconomic environment by including lagged inflation (retrieved from the BIS), GDP growth and investment growth (retrieved from the OECD), and a banking crisis dummy (from Laeven and Valencia, 2018) as control variables. Table 1 reports summary statistics for these variables, and Table IA.1 in Internet Appendix C.1 details the definitions and sources of all variables in the sample.

Whereas including the control variables improves the identification, there may be other confounders biasing the estimate for α . For example, unobserved changes in government policies could simultaneously affect both interest and surrender rates. Moreover, higher surrender rates may reduce life insurers' bond demand and, thereby, exert upward pressure on bond yields. We tackle these identification challenges in two steps.

First, we narrow in on the economic mechanism. If policyholders react to interest rate changes due to financial motives, α will decrease with a larger expected contract return (as implied by Inequality 7). Because expected contract returns are not directly observable,

Table 1. Summary Statistics.

An insurer's surrender rate and share of new business are retrieved from BaFin's *Erstversicherungsstatistik* at the insurer-year level. The sample starts in 1996 and ends in 2019 and includes 160 German life insurers in total. Variable definitions and sources are detailed in Internet Appendix C.1.

| | N | Mean | SD | p5 | p50 | p95 |
|-----------------------------------------------------|-------|-------|------|-------|-------|-------|
| Insurer characteristics (insurer-year level) | | | | | | |
| Surrender rate $_{i,t}$ (in ppt) | 2,251 | 4.84 | 2.40 | 1.70 | 4.49 | 9.62 |
| New business $_{i,t-1}$ (in ppt) | 2,251 | 11.94 | 9.37 | 2.25 | 9.61 | 31.64 |
| Macroeconomic characteristics (year level) | | | | | | |
| Interest rate $_{t-1}$ (in ppt) | 24 | 3.42 | 1.96 | 0.39 | 3.97 | 6.30 |
| MoPoSurp $_{t-1}$ (in ppt) | 24 | -3.14 | 0.90 | -4.14 | -3.14 | -1.71 |
| Guarantee $_{t-1}$ (in ppt) | 24 | 2.60 | 1.03 | 0.90 | 2.50 | 4.00 |
| Contract return $_t$ (in ppt) | 24 | 4.71 | 1.69 | 2.47 | 4.26 | 7.31 |
| New term life $_{t-1}$ (in ppt) | 24 | 21.55 | 6.09 | 11.43 | 20.50 | 29.60 |
| log(New German contracts $_{t-1}$) | 24 | 14.96 | 0.37 | 14.45 | 15.06 | 15.61 |
| Inflation $_{t-1}$ (in ppt) | 24 | 1.42 | 0.59 | 0.49 | 1.49 | 2.28 |
| GDP growth $_{t-1}$ (in ppt) | 24 | 3.60 | 2.05 | 1.49 | 3.67 | 6.96 |
| Investment growth $_{t-1}$ (in ppt) | 24 | -0.55 | 2.96 | -5.95 | 0.13 | 3.74 |
| Crisis $_{t-1}$ (binary) | 24 | 0.08 | 0.28 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 1.00 |

in a second empirical specification, we include an interaction term between the interest rate level and the guaranteed minimum contract return, instead. The guaranteed return is given by the German technical discount rate (Eling and Holder, 2013) and accounts for the guaranteed component of expected contract returns. It is a key feature of the German life insurance market that is observable to all policyholders without uncertainty about its level. The coefficient on the interaction term reflects whether the sensitivity to the interest rate level changes with a larger guaranteed return. In addition, we also include the average market-wide realized contract return for the current year as a control variable (obtained from Assekurata) and expect the coefficient on this variable to be negative, reflecting weaker surrender motives when contract returns are higher.

Because the guaranteed return applies only to new contracts, we expect its effect on surrender decisions to be stronger for insurers with a larger share of new insurance business. We test this mechanism in a third empirical specification by including a triple interaction term of interest rate, guarantee, and share of new business. Since the estimation of its

coefficient relies on variation *across* life insurers, in this specification, we remove unobserved variation in the macroeconomic and financial market environment by including time fixed effects.

Second, we instrument the German government bond rate with U.S. monetary policy surprises. Central bank announcements isolate unexpected variation in monetary policy from economic fundamentals (Gertler and Karadi, 2015; Jarocinski and Karadi, 2020). Because German life insurers' investments in U.S. Treasuries are negligible, their bond demand has a negligible impact on U.S. monetary policy.¹⁰ This alleviates potential bias due to reverse causality. Even if, despite this reasoning, the exclusion restriction was (partly) violated, the instrumental variable strategy would lead to a more conservative estimate because monetary policy stimulates the economy by *reducing* interest rates in those times, in which deteriorating economic growth might cause increasing surrender rates. Since Equation (1) includes the interest rate in levels instead of changes, we follow previous literature (e.g., Romer and Romer, 2004) and cumulate monetary policy surprises, using $\text{MoPoSurp}_{t-1} = \sum_{j \leq t-1} m_j$ as an instrument. m_j is the change in fed funds futures from 10 minutes before and 20 minutes after an FOMC announcement on date j , following Jarocinski and Karadi (2020).¹¹

¹⁰German life insurers held EUR 723.8 million in U.S. Treasuries as of 2018 (Source: *EIOPA Insurance Statistics*), compared to EUR 10,789 billion in publicly held and marketable U.S. government bills, notes, and bonds outstanding in 2018 Q1 (Source: *U.S. Treasury's "Monthly statement of the public debt of the United States"*).

¹¹We define m_j as the first principal component of the surprises in interest rate derivatives with maturities from 1 month to 1 year, which we retrieve from Marek Jarocinski's website: <http://marekjarocinski.github.io>. Figure IA.1 depicts monetary policy surprises and German government bond rates.

3.2 Results

Consistent with the hypothesis that higher interest rates boost surrender rates, the first column of Table 2 documents a positive and highly significant (at the 1% level) coefficient on the German government bond rate in the baseline specification (1). The point estimate implies that surrender rates increase by 25 bps for each 1 ppt increase in the interest rate. A one standard deviation interest rate increase relates to an increase in surrender rates by 0.19 standard deviations (or 45.6 bps), which in aggregate corresponds to approximately EUR 2.2 billion in surrender payouts.¹² Hence, the magnitude is economically highly significant.

Next, we examine the interaction between interest rates and contracts' guaranteed minimum return. Since we only observe the guaranteed return for new insurance contracts, in column (2) we only consider insurers with a large share of new insurance business (i.e., with "young contracts"), namely insurer-year observations with the 50% largest share of new business in the sample. We find a large and significantly negative coefficient on the interaction term between the interest rate and guaranteed returns. This result is consistent with policyholders reacting to surrender options moving toward the money, since a larger guaranteed return implies a lower sensitivity of surrender options to market interest rates. We also find a significantly negative coefficient on the contract return, consistent with policyholders trading off the financial value of their contracts with surrender values.¹³

¹²The annual ratio of aggregate surrender payouts to the aggregate volume of insurance surrendered ranges from 14.1% to 17%, with an average of 15.5% according to BaFin's *Erstversicherungsstatistik* from 2011 to 2019. Using the aggregate volume of insurance in Germany at year-begin 2019 (EUR 3,126 billion), a one-standard-deviation increase in the interest rate approximately corresponds to an increase in surrender payouts of $0.00456 \times 0.155 \times 3,126 \approx \text{EUR } 2.2 \text{ billion}$.

¹³In Table IA.2 in Internet Appendix C, we also report coefficients for specifications that control for the average future contract return, which approximates expected contract returns. The coefficient on this variable also typically enters with a negative sign, which, however, is not statistically significant. This suggests that policyholders primarily focus on current contract returns when deciding whether to surrender.

Because the guaranteed return applies only to new contracts, its effect on surrender rates' interest rate sensitivity should be stronger for insurers with a larger share of new business. We test this hypothesis in the full sample by including a triple-interaction term of interest rates, guaranteed return, and an insurer's share of new business. Importantly, this specification also includes year fixed effects, which remove any unobserved aggregate variation, e.g., in the macroeconomic environment. In column (3), we find that the coefficient on the triple-interaction term is significantly negative. Thus, the negative impact of guaranteed returns on the interest rate sensitivity of surrender rates significantly increases with the share of new business, consistent with the hypothesis.

Columns (4) to (6) provide IV estimates for the previous specifications. Tighter U.S. monetary policy increases U.S. Treasury rates, which strongly co-move with German government bond rates (Jotikasthira et al., 2015; Bekaert and Ermolov, 2023). As a result, the coefficient on monetary policy surprises is significantly positive in our first-stage regressions. The F statistic in the first stage is well above the critical value of 10, alleviating concerns that the instrument is weak. The IV strategy results in point estimates and statistical significance of coefficients in the second stage similar to the OLS estimates. These results provide strong evidence for a causal effect of interest rates on surrender rates.

We also observe that the average future contract return is primarily important for young rather than old contracts, which is consistent with the particularly high return sensitivity of young contracts in the calibrated model (see Section 4.1.2).

Table 2. Surrender Rates and Interest Rates.

This table presents estimates from regressions of insurer-level annual surrender rates on the 10-year German government bond rate from 1996 to 2019. Interest rate_{*t*-1} is the 10-year German government bond rate. Contract return_{*t*} is the average return on German traditional life insurance contracts. New business_{*i,t*-1} is the lagged volume of new insurance business relative to that of total insurance business at the previous year's end. Guarantee_{*t*-1} is the lagged guaranteed minimum return for new German life insurance contracts. Macroeconomic control variables are German inflation, GDP growth, investment growth, a banking crisis indicator, the log of the number of new German life insurance contracts and, among these, the share of new term life contracts, all lagged by one year. *u_i* and *v_t* are insurer and year fixed effects, respectively. Columns (1) to (3) report OLS estimates. Columns (4) to (6) report IV estimates with lagged cumulative U.S. monetary policy surprises, MoPoSurp_{*t*-1}, as an instrument for the 10-year German government bond rate. The bottom of the table reports first stage results with either Interest rate_{*t*-1} (columns 4 and 5) or Interest rate_{*t*-1} × Guarantee_{*t*-1} × New business_{*i,t*-1} (column 6) as dependent variable. Detailed variable definitions and data sources are reported in Internet Appendix C. *t*-statistics are shown in brackets, based on standard errors that are clustered at the insurer level. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level.

| Dependent variable: | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|--------------------|---------------------|---------------------|--------------------|---------------------|
| | Surrender rate _{<i>i,t</i>} | | | | | |
| | OLS | | IV | | | |
| Sample: | Full | Young contracts | Full | Young contracts | Full | |
| Interest rate _{<i>t</i>-1} | 0.25*** [5.81] | 0.67*** [2.84] | 0.22*** [4.26] | 0.91** [2.56] | | |
| Interest rate _{<i>t</i>-1} × Guarantee _{<i>t</i>-1} | | -0.20** [-2.56] | | -0.26*** [-2.71] | | |
| Guarantee _{<i>t</i>-1} | | 1.29*** [4.39] | | 1.26*** [3.81] | | |
| Contract return _{<i>t</i>} | | -0.22* [-1.87] | | -0.19 [-1.59] | | |
| Interest rate _{<i>t</i>-1} × Guarantee _{<i>t</i>-1} × New business _{<i>i,t</i>-1} | | | -0.02*** [-3.93] | | | -0.02*** [-3.34] |
| Macro controls | Y | Y | | Y | Y | |
| New business _{<i>i,t</i>-1} | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| Interest rate _{<i>t</i>-1} × New business _{<i>i,t</i>-1} | | | Y | | | Y |
| Guarantee _{<i>t</i>-1} × New business _{<i>i,t</i>-1} | | | Y | | | Y |
| Insurer FE | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| Year FE | | | Y | | | Y |
| First stage | | | | | | |
| MoPoSurp _{<i>t</i>-1} | | | | 1.77*** [208.62] | 2.02*** [25.24] | |
| MoPoSurp _{<i>t</i>-1} × Guarantee _{<i>t</i>-1} × New business _{<i>i,t</i>-1} | | | | | | 0.47** [2.45] |
| F Statistic | | | | 6,750 | 232 | 237 |
| No. of obs. | 2,251 | 1,121 | 2,251 | 2,251 | 1,121 | 2,251 |
| No. of insurers | 160 | 137 | 160 | 160 | 137 | 160 |
| Standardized coefficients | | | | | | |
| Interest rate _{<i>t</i>-1} | 0.19 | 0.45 | | 0.17 | 0.62 | |

We provide additional results in Table IA.3 in Internet Appendix C. First, we address the concern that central bank announcements might also convey information about potentially confounding economic conditions. We follow the methodology in [Jarocinski and Karadi \(2020\)](#) and rely solely on variation from “pure” monetary policy surprises, which are purged of information shocks using stock market reactions. Additionally, we add the ratio of U.S. imports from Germany relative to all imports and exports between the U.S. and Germany as a control variable for trade links. Nonetheless, the IV estimate for the coefficient on the interest rate hardly changes in magnitude or significance, supporting the initial identification strategy. Second, we find that the magnitude of the second-stage estimate is similar when using the 10-year U.S. Treasury rate as an alternative instrument, which supports the argument that U.S. monetary policy transmits through co-movement of international bond yields.

Third, we document that the coefficient on U.S. monetary policy surprises becomes insignificant once controlling for the German government bonds rate. This result supports the exclusion restriction: if U.S. monetary policy affected German surrender rates through a channel other than market interest rates, one would expect the coefficient on U.S. monetary policy surprises to remain significant after controlling for German interest rates, contrary to our results.

Finally, we investigate on government bond rate and surrender rate dynamics. Interest rates are, on average, declining in the sample. To explore whether the effect of interest rates differs between periods with rising and declining interest rates, we estimate the baseline specification in changes, i.e., we regress annual changes in the surrender rate on annual changes in the government bond rate. The coefficient is significantly different from zero and

close in magnitude to the coefficient in our baseline model. Thus, common trends in the level of the surrender rate and government bond rate cannot explain the baseline results. In addition, we interact the government bond rate change with a dummy variable that indicates increasing government bond rates. The effect of the interaction term is positive and significant at the 1% level. Thus, the effect of government bond rates on surrender decisions is not weaker but, instead, significantly stronger when interest rates increase.

4 Surrender Options and Financial Fragility

In this section, we develop and calibrate a model that quantifies the impact of surrender options on liquidity in the life insurance sector and spillovers to financial markets.

4.1 Model

We first propose and estimate a model for the surrender of life insurance savings contracts. Second, we embed this model into a broader setting that captures the balance sheet and cash flow dynamics of a representative German life insurer that sells savings contracts with surrender options and minimum guaranteed returns, calibrated to the end of 2015.¹⁴ Below, we describe the defining ingredients of the model and relegate more details to Internet Appendix D, in which we also provide an overview of the model components and their interactions.

¹⁴A granular stress test by the EIOPA (2016), with January 1, 2016, as the reference date, allows us to calibrate the insurer’s balance sheet in great detail. The Fed started to raise interest rates in 2015, while the ECB did not. Assessing the adequacy of rising interest rates after 2015 is beyond the scope of this paper.

4.1.1 Life Insurance Contracts. We model the key features of German participating life insurance savings contracts, applying to more than half of the German life insurance market (see Section 2): long maturities, the option to surrender and receive an ex-ante guaranteed surrender value, a minimum guaranteed annual return (fixed at contract origination), and mortality payouts. Specifically, at the end of every year, the contract includes financial protection against the death of the policyholder during the upcoming year. We denote by q_t^h the mortality rate in cohort h , defined as the probability of death during year $t+1$ conditional on survival until the end of year t . v_m is the fixed insurance payout in case of death per contract and, thus, $q_t^h v_m$ is the actuarially fair premium. V_t^h denotes the total cash value of the savings component of all contracts in cohort h at the end of year t . The cash value is accumulated from premiums P^h per contract net of the actuarially fair premium associated with the mortality component and given by

$$V_{t+1}^h = \frac{N_{t+1}^h}{N_t^h} \cdot (1 + \tilde{r}_{P,t+1}^h) \cdot V_t^h + N_{t+1}^h \cdot (P^h - q_{t+1}^h v_m), \quad (2)$$

where N_t^h is the number of policyholders at year-end t , $\tilde{r}_{P,t+1}^h$ is the annual contract return credited to policyholders at year-end $t+1$, and P^h are the annual premiums paid by each policyholder to the insurer.

At contract origination $t = h$, the cash value equals the total premium payments by new policyholders net of the fair premium of the mortality component, $V_h^h = N_h^h (P^h - q_h^h v_m)$. We assume that the number of new policyholders at contract origination h is fixed over time, $N_h^h \equiv N$. ¹⁵ Policyholder dynamics are driven by surrenders and deaths, i.e., the

¹⁵Time-varying insurance demand is implicitly captured by policyholders' ability to surrender contracts in

share of the previous year's policyholders that either surrender or die in the current year. We denote by S_{t+1}^h the number of surrenders and by D_{t+1}^h the number of deaths between year-ends t and $t + 1$ in cohort h and, thus, $N_{t+1}^h = N_t^h - D_{t+1}^h - S_{t+1}^h$, assuming that only surviving policyholders may surrender their contracts. The realized mortality rate in cohort h is $\frac{D_{t+1}^h}{N_t^h}$ and the realized surrender rate is $\frac{S_{t+1}^h}{N_t^h - D_{t+1}^h}$. At contract maturity T^h , each policyholder receives the cash value $V_{T^h}^h / N_{T^h}^h$ as a lump-sum payout.¹⁶ The beneficiaries of deceased policyholders receive v_m per contract, whereas surrendering policyholders receive the surrender value.

The annual contract return is given by the maximum of the guaranteed rate of return and the insurer's investment return:

$$\tilde{r}_{P,t+1}^h = \max\{r_G^h, \tilde{r}_{t+1}^*\}. \quad (3)$$

r_G^h is a cohort h 's guaranteed minimum rate of return, which is fixed at contract origination h for the entire contract life. As common in Germany, we assume that r_G^h is annually adjusted to 60% of the 10-year trailing average of 10-year German government bond rates in 50 bps steps (Eling and Holder, 2013).¹⁷ \tilde{r}_{t+1}^* is the profit participation rate. Premiums are jointly

the first year after purchase. As we show that contract returns react to changes in interest rates with a considerable time lag, it is reasonable to assume that life insurance demand decreases following an interest rate rise, reducing the insurer's cash inflow. In this case, the assumption of a fixed number of new policyholders makes our estimates of insurers' asset sales more conservative.

¹⁶Life insurance contracts often allow policyholders to transform the lump sum payout into an annuity at maturity. However, policyholders usually prefer receiving the lump-sum payout, which is referred to as the *annuity puzzle* (see, e.g., Brown, 2001). For instance, more than half of German savings contracts and annuity reserves are for endowment insurance contracts (*Kapitalversicherungen*), which pay out a policyholder's savings as a lump sum at maturity by default (GDV, 2020).

¹⁷Regulators in many countries set maximum levels for guaranteed returns that depend on long-term interest rate averages. German insurers have typically offered guaranteed returns equal to this maximum level. German law has specified 60% of the 10-year yield on AAA-rated European government bonds as the maximum guaranteed return until 2015 (§65 Insurance Supervision Act). Since 2015, the calculation of this cap is unspecified (§88 Insurance Supervision Act). However, the German regulator has not deviated

invested in the insurer's general account. Policyholders receive a fraction ν of the insurer's total investment income R_{t+1}^{inv} and mortality income R_{t+1}^{mort} , such that the profit participation rate is equal to

$$\tilde{r}_{t+1}^* = \nu \frac{\max(R_{t+1}^{inv}, 0) + \max(R_{t+1}^{mort}, 0)}{\sum_h V_t^h}. \quad (4)$$

R_{t+1}^{inv} is determined by historical cost accounting and equals the sum of bond coupon payments, dividends, and rents less of depreciations.¹⁸ R_{t+1}^{mort} is equal to the difference between expected mortality payouts, $\sum_h N_t^h q_t^h v_m$, and realized payments, $\sum_h D_{t+1}^h v_m$. $\nu \geq 90\%$ according to German regulation (the *Mindestzuführungsverordnung*) and, thus, we assume $\nu = 90\%$ in the model.

4.1.2 Surrender Decisions. We consider a policyholder at year-begin t with a contract originated at year-end h , $h < t$. Her current cash value is $v_{t-1}^h = V_{t-1}^h / N_{t-1}^h$ and her surrender value is $sv_{t-1}^h = SV_{t-1}^h / N_{t-1}^h$, both determined at year-end $t-1$. The surrender value equals the cash value less the surrender penalty $1 - \vartheta$, $\vartheta \in (0, 1)$, such that $sv_{t-1}^h = \vartheta v_{t-1}^h$. While we do not explicitly model fees that cover administrative costs in the insurer's cash flow (since they would net out in the overall cash flow), fees (and taxes) may affect surrender decisions. Without loss of generality, we assume that policyholders pay fees at the earlier of the surrender or the maturity date. Moreover, the utility that policyholders derive from the mortality component of contracts may vary over the lifetime of contracts. For example, older

significantly from the historical rule.

¹⁸Depreciations occur when market values fall below book values on an insurer's national GAAP (historical cost) balance sheet. In particular, in our model, if the market value falls below 90% of the (most recent) book value (representing a material decrease in value), then the asset is written down to the market value; instead, the asset appreciates to the minimum of the market value and the face value if the market value exceeds the book value.

policyholders might value this component less and, then, may be more inclined to surrender their contracts. Assuming a similar age of policyholders at contract inception, the value of the mortality component is a function of contract age. Surrender incentives may vary over a contract's lifetime more generally (Gottlieb and Smetters, 2021; Koijen et al., 2024). We use a reduced-form approach to jointly model the time-varying value of the mortality component, cumulative fees (and taxes), and other trends in surrender incentives over contract lifetimes as a proportional cost $c(t - (h + 1))$ depending on contract age $t - (h + 1)$.¹⁹

The idiosyncratic component of the utility from surrender is given by $e^{\mathcal{L}}$ and reflects the utility from satisfying liquidity needs, e.g., arising from medical expenses, net of transaction costs, such as the loss of the option to convert the contract into an annuity or the loss of mortality payouts tied to the contract. We allow \mathcal{L} to vary across policyholders, both across and within cohorts, reflecting differences in liquidity needs and transaction costs. The net surrender value is then given by $sv_{t-1}^h e^{\mathcal{L}-c(t-(h+1))}$.

A policyholder surrenders her contract if the net surrender value $sv_{t-1}^h e^{\mathcal{L}-c(t-(h+1))}$ exceeds the value of keeping the policy m_{t-1}^h :

$$sv_{t-1}^h e^{\mathcal{L}-c(t-h-1)} > m_{t-1}^h e^{-c(T^h-h)}. \quad (5)$$

It is straightforward to micro-found Inequality (5) by assuming that policyholders either compare keeping the life insurance contract to outside investment opportunities or the surrender option to other funding sources (such as mortgages) or consumption.

¹⁹Bauer et al. (2017) provide a detailed discussion of how to model policyholder behavior in life insurance.

The present value of the contract's cash value is given by

$$m_{t-1}^h = v_{t-1}^h \mathbb{E} \left[\frac{\prod_{\tau=1}^{T^h-(t-1)} (1 + \max\{r_G^h, \tilde{r}_{t-1+\tau}^*\})}{(1 + r_{f,t-1,T^h-(t-1)})^{T^h-(t-1)}} \right]. \quad (6)$$

Whereas the current cash value v_{t-1}^h , guaranteed rate r_G^h , and interest rate $r_{f,t-1,T^h-(t-1)}$ are known to the policyholder, there is uncertainty about future profit participation rates $\tilde{r}_{t-1+\tau}^*$. To compute m_{t-1}^h , on each simulation path at each point in time, we simulate the future profit participation rate $\tilde{r}_{t+1+\tau}^*$ using the actual dynamics of the financial market and insurer balance sheet in our model. Therefore, policyholder expectations about future contract returns are consistent with the model dynamics.²⁰

Then, the incentive constraint to surrender in Inequality (5) is equivalent to

$$\mathcal{L} > \log \mathbb{E} \left[\vartheta^{-1} \frac{\prod_{\tau=1}^{T^h-(t-1)} (1 + \max\{r_G^h, \tilde{r}_{t-1+\tau}^*\})}{(1 + r_{f,t-1,T^h-(t-1)})^{T^h-(t-1)}} \right] - \Delta c_t. \quad (7)$$

The right-hand side of Inequality (7) is equal to the log of the value of the contract relative to its surrender value, $\log \frac{m_{t-1}^h}{sv_{t-1}^h}$, less of future fees $\Delta c_t = c(T^h - h) - c(t - (h + 1))$. If $\mathcal{L} = 0$ and $\Delta c_t = 0$, all policyholders surrender if the discount rate, $r_{f,t-1,T^h-(t-1)}$, exceeds the annualized expected contract return. Instead, variation in \mathcal{L} and Δc_t reflects differences in the willingness to continue holding the life insurance contract across policyholders and cohorts, respectively.

²⁰We capture the option value to surrender in the future implicitly in the transaction costs embedded in \mathcal{L} and in the slope of fees $c'(\cdot)$. Estimating future contract returns implies that, for each of N main simulation paths at each point in time t , the balance sheet is simulated \hat{T} years forward using \hat{N} paths. This increases the computational effort exponentially. To limit the computational effort, we simulate future contract returns assuming the same balance sheet dynamics as in the main model but abstracting from fire sale losses and holding the distribution of surrender rates across cohorts fixed at the most recent realization.

We calibrate the model to empirically observed surrender rates. For this purpose, we assume that \mathcal{L} is normally and independently distributed across policyholders and time with expected value μ_L and variance σ_L^2 , and we parametrize $c(x) = k \log(2 + x)$. Then, the surrender rate (i.e., the probability to surrender) in cohort h in year t is given by

$$\lambda_t^h = 1 - \Phi \left(\underbrace{\frac{-k \cdot \log(2 + T^h - h) - \mu_L}{\sigma_L}}_{=\beta_0} + \underbrace{\frac{1}{\sigma_L}}_{=\beta_1} \cdot \log \frac{m_{t-1}^h}{sv_{t-1}^h} + \underbrace{\frac{k}{\sigma_L}}_{=\beta_2} \cdot \log(2 + (t - (h + 1))) \right), \quad (8)$$


where $\Phi(\cdot)$ is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution. Holding contract returns fixed, λ_t^h increases with a higher discount rate. However, higher rates also raise future investment returns and, thus, contract returns. Therefore, the ultimate impact of higher interest rates depends on the pass-through of interest rates to contract returns.

We estimate β_0, β_1 , and β_2 by matching the empirically observed surrender rates in the Erstversicherungsstatistik (described in Section 3) to the distribution of surrender rates implied by our model at $t = 1$, as detailed in Internet Appendix D.1. In particular, we require that the average model-implied surrender rate coincides with the realized surrender rate for the average German life insurer (a) for the average cohort and (b) for young cohorts, and we match the surrender rates in the cross-section of contract returns for young cohorts in the model and in the data. Figure 2 illustrates the sensitivity of calibrated surrender rates to shifts in future contract returns for contracts in different cohorts. The estimated surrender rate slopes down with a higher expected contract return, which imposes higher opportunity costs of surrender. Young cohorts display a high sensitivity to (expected) contract returns as their contracts have a long expected duration, whereas old cohorts display a high sensitivity

stemming from a lower willingness to continue holding the contract.

Figure 2. Surrender Rate Calibration.

The figure depicts the surrender rate in the first year of the simulation as a function of shifts δ in all future annual contract returns $\tilde{r}_{P,t+\tau}$ and for different times to contract maturity, TtM , of 15, 25, and 35 years.



4.1.3 Balance Sheet Dynamics and Calibration. We track the insurer's balance sheet at both mark-to-market (consistent with solvency regulation) and national book value accounting, which determines profit participation rates. The starting point of the model is the end of year $t = 0$, which we calibrate to the end of 2015. The contract portfolio consists of 40 cohorts, with all contracts having a fixed lifetime of $T^h - h = 40$ years at contract origination. The oldest cohort $h = -39$ was sold at year-end $t = -39$ (i.e., 1976) with the guaranteed return $r_G^{-39} = 3\%$, and the latest was sold in $t = 0$ (i.e., 2015) with $r_G^0 = 1.25\%$, as implied by the historical evolution of guaranteed returns in Germany.

To compute the relative size of cohorts at $t = 0$, we draw on the historical evolution of the volume of new life insurance, average surrender rates, and contract returns in Germany and extrapolate where needed, while targeting the modified duration and average guaranteed rate reported for German life insurers, as described in Internet Appendix D.3. To calibrate the death probability of policyholders q_t^h , we assume that policyholder age is a function of

Table 3. Initial Calibration of the Insurer’s Balance Sheet.

The table depicts the the average surrender rate in year $t = 1$ weighted by cash values V_t^h and characteristics of the initial balance sheet at (year-end) $t = 0$ (average guaranteed return, average remaining contract lifetime, equity capital / assets, and durations).

| Variable | Initial value |
|----------------------------------|---------------|
| Average surrender rate | 3.65% |
| Average guaranteed return | 3.12% |
| Avg. remaining contract lifetime | 25.58 |
| Equity capital / assets | 9% |
| Modified Duration (Contracts) | 13.94 |
| Modified Duration (Assets) | 9.31 |

contract age, with policyholders purchasing a contract at the age of 25. Then, q_t^h is given by the lifetable for the German population in 2015, retrieved from Eurostat. The mortality payout v_m is calibrated such that the share of premiums paid by a 25 year-old for the mortality component amounts to 1% of total premiums.²¹

The insurer invests in government bonds, corporate bonds, stocks, and real estate. The detailed modeling of the insurer’s fixed-income portfolio is important to calibrate the investment return dynamics, which determine contract returns and cash flows. For this purpose, we separately model the government bonds of the largest euro-area economies (Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Netherlands) and AAA, AA, A, and BBB corporate bonds (as described in the next section). We assume that government bonds have a time to maturity of 20 years at issuance and corporate bonds of 10 years. In each bond category, the insurer holds a revolving portfolio of bonds with all available times to maturity (in annual steps), i.e., corporate bonds with 1, 2, ..., 10 years and government bonds with 1, 2, ..., 20 years to

²¹We choose the relative size of mortality payouts in the absence of sufficiently detailed data for calibration. Our calibration implies that the mortality payout for a contract with annual premiums of EUR 4,000 (or, equivalently, monthly premiums of EUR 333,33) is equal to $v_m = 4,000 \times \frac{0.01}{q_t^h} = 4,000 \times \frac{0.01}{0.00034} = 117,647$, which we find reasonable based on anecdotal evidence. Due to increasing policyholder age over time, the mortality component share of premiums increases to close to 30% in the last year before contract maturity. The results are robust to changing the level of v_m .

maturity. The initial portfolio weights and interest rate durations are calibrated based on (GDV, 2016) and (EIOPA, 2014, 2016), as detailed in Internet Appendix D.4. Fixed income is the most important asset class, with 55% of assets invested in government bonds and 34% invested in corporate bonds.

Given the investment portfolio, the contract portfolio, and asset prices at year-end $t = 0$, we determine the insurer’s leverage by matching the ratio of equity capital to total assets (both at market value) of 9%. This level corresponds to the ratio of equity capital to total assets of 8.8% for the average German life insurer in January 2016 (EIOPA, 2016).²² It is also consistent with the ratio of market equity to total assets of listed European life insurers in 2015.²³

The resulting calibrated balance sheet, reported in Table 3, closely matches the balance sheet of German life insurers. By construction, the average surrender rate, investment portfolio allocation, and the insurer’s leverage coincide with the empirical moments described above. The initial contract portfolio exhibits an average guaranteed return of 3.12% per contract and a modified duration of 13.9 years, which are both close to the average guaranteed return reported by Assekurata (2016) (2.97% in 2015) and the duration reported by the German association of insurers (GDV) to us (14.1 for the median insurer and 14.8 for the weighted average in 2013). In contrast, the initial average contract return in the first year of our simulation (4.3%) exceeds the contract return reported by Assekurata to us (3.16%

²²Specifically, (EIOPA, 2016, Figure 10) reports that total assets divided by total liabilities is 109.5% for a large sample of German insurers that consists almost entirely of life insurers. This corresponds to a capital ratio of 8.8%. We compute life insurance liabilities as outlined in Internet Appendix D.2.

²³We retrieve quarterly data on market capitalization and total assets for all firms classified by Thomson Reuters Eikon as European life insurers and then take the average ratio of market capitalization to total assets across quarters in 2015 for each firm. The ratio of market capitalization to total assets ranges from 2.4% to 13.7% at the 10th and 90th percentile, respectively.

in 2015), which may be due to the absence of fees and administrative costs in our model.

Starting with the initial investment portfolio, the insurer maintains a constant relative duration gap, which is

$$\frac{D_0^L - D_0^A}{D_0^L} = \tilde{D}, \quad (9)$$

where D_0^A is the initial asset duration, D_0^L is the initial liability duration, and $0 < \tilde{D} < 1$ is the target relative duration gap.²⁴ This assumption is consistent with the duration of insurers' assets following that of their liabilities in practice (Domanski et al., 2015). Based on the new duration of liabilities D_t^L at year-end t , the insurer adjusts the duration of the investment portfolio to maintain the duration gap \tilde{D} . For this purpose, new portfolio weights are determined such that the duration within each asset class matches its initial duration multiplied by $(1 - \tilde{D})D_t^L/D_0^A$ (as described in Internet Appendix D.4). To elicit the impact of duration matching, we also report the results of a counterfactual calibration in which the insurer keeps the portfolio weights fixed at market values.

4.1.4 Financial Market Model. We use a stochastic financial market model to simulate (1) German government bond rates, (2) spreads of other bonds, and (3) stock and real estate returns. Short rates evolve according to Vasicek (1977)'s model and drive the evolution of German government bond rates, calibrated as described in Internet Appendix D.5. Bond spreads follow Ornstein-Uhlenbeck processes, and stocks and real estate indices follow geometric Brownian motions. We assume that bonds are priced at par at issuance,

²⁴This assumption is similar to that in Ozdagli and Wang (2020)'s model, in which \tilde{D} equals one minus the insurer's leverage ratio.

which allows us to back out coupon rates. All stochastic processes are calibrated based on monthly data from December 2000 to November 2015, as described in Internet Appendix D.6.

4.1.5 Asset Sales and Price Impact. At the end of each year t , (1) the insurer makes payments on surrendered contracts and deceased policyholders, (2) investment returns realize, (3) contract returns are credited to non-surrendered contracts, (4) active (non-surrendered and non-matured surviving) policyholders pay premiums, and (5) a new contract cohort is created (as illustrated in Figure IA.2 in Internet Appendix D). These dynamics determine the insurer’s free cash flow, which is the difference between cash inflow (the sum of premiums paid, investment income, and bond redemptions) and cash outflow (the sum of payouts for matured and surrendered contracts). When the free cash flow is positive, the insurer purchases assets.

We assume that the insurer accommodates a negative free cash flow by selling assets instead of borrowing or issuing equity. This assumption is common in prior studies of systemic risk and fire sales (Greenwood et al., 2015; Duarte and Eisenbach, 2021) as it allows to assess the *potential* spillovers to financial markets. It is consistent with empirical evidence that asset sales are insurers’ and pension funds’ primary means of managing short-term liquidity needs (Girardi et al., 2021; Alfaro et al., 2024; Jansen et al., 2024). This evidence aligns with the emphasis of the corporate finance literature on frictions in debt and equity issuance, which raise the costs of external financing (Myers and Majluf, 1984).²⁵ Supporting the assumption, we document that higher surrender rates are not significantly correlated with

²⁵Borrowing may also be perceived as a negative signal about an insurer’s liquidity.

higher debt or equity issuance of German life insurers (see Internet Appendix F). Moreover, life insurers make limited use of debt financing in general, especially when compared to the volume of surrender payouts. For example, surrender payouts correspond to more than six times the amount of insurers' financial liabilities to credit institutions (Source: *EIOPA Insurance Statistics*). Finally, borrowing costs are likely substantially larger than fire sale costs, which peak at close to 80 bps in our results. Thus, it may be (individually) optimal for insurers to engage in asset sales despite their price impact.

We consider segmentation between the markets for (1) short-term bonds (those with a remaining time to maturity of up to 10 years), (2) long-term bonds (those with a remaining time to maturity of more than 10 years), and (3) stocks and real estate (funds). The market value of the insurer's total (invested) assets at year-end t after realization of cash flows and re-adjustment of the insurer's investment portfolio (denoted as time $t+$) is

$$A_{t+} = A_{t-} + FCF_t - FSC_t, \quad (10)$$

where A_{t-} is the market value of total assets at year-end t before cash flows realize, FCF_t is the free cash flow, and FSC_t are fire sale costs resulting from the insurer's price impact. w_t^k is the target weight for asset class $k \in \mathcal{K} = \{\text{short-term bonds, long-term bonds, stocks \& real estate}\}$ at time $t+$, and a_{t-}^k the market value of assets in class k at time $t-$. Net sales in asset class k (based on prices at $t-$) are thus equal to $-(w_t^k A_{t+} - a_{t-}^k)$.

Following [Greenwood et al. \(2015\)](#), we assume that $\delta = 10^{-4}$ (1 bp) is the price impact per EUR 1 billion of net sales within each asset class, consistent with the price impact of U.S. insurers' fire sales after bond downgrades ([Ellul et al., 2011](#)). Whereas this assumption

is simplistic, it minimizes the number of parameters that must be calibrated and, thus, is very transparent. Nonetheless, it would be straightforward to implement other price impact functions. We assume that the price impact dissipates within one year, which is consistent with empirical evidence that prices revert within 6 to 8 months after fire sales (Ellul et al., 2011; Massa and Zhang, 2021; Kubitza, 2025).

To compute meaningful estimates for the insurer's price impact, we need to specify the size of its balance sheet. Interest rate changes systematically affect surrender incentives of contracts with similar contractual features. To account for this systematic effect, we scale our model by the factor Ω such that the total volume of life insurance reserves in the model equals that of European participating life insurance contracts with surrender guarantees, which we estimate to be 80% of European life insurance reserves for participating contracts in 2016Q3: EUR 0.8×5.238 trillion.²⁶ This estimate is conservative because insurers also offer surrender guarantees on nonparticipating contracts (EIOPA, 2019), which we exclude because of their different investment dynamics.

Under these assumptions, the total fire sale costs in asset class k are given by

$$\underbrace{\delta \cdot \Omega \cdot \max\{-(w_t^k A_{t+} - a_{t-}^k), 0\}}_{\text{Price impact}_t^k} \cdot \underbrace{\max\{-(w_t^k A_{t+} - a_{t-}^k), 0\}}_{\text{Sales}_t^k}. \quad (11)$$

The price impact reflects externalities generated by asset sales on other institutions. Plugging

²⁶Source: *EIOPA Insurance Statistics*. German life insurance reserves account for approximately 19% of European life insurance reserves. Whereas our model is calibrated based on data from 2015, the earliest available data on European life insurance reserves under a uniform accounting regime (following the Solvency II standards) are from 2016Q3. Since the volatility of European life insurance reserves over time is very low (the standard deviation of quarterly European life insurance reserves between 2016Q3 and 2018Q1 is approximately 2% relative to 2016Q3), we use the value from 2016Q3 to scale our model.

this expression into Equation (10) yields

$$A_{t+} = A_{t-} + FCF_t - \sum_{k \in \mathcal{K}} \delta \cdot \Omega \cdot \max\{-(w_t^k A_{t+} - a_{t-}^k), 0\}^2. \quad (12)$$

The insurer's previous year's asset allocation, contract portfolio, and the financial market model jointly determine A_{t-} , a_{t-}^k , and FCF_t . The investment strategy determines w_t^k (which is either fixed or varying with the duration of liabilities). δ and Ω are exogenous parameters. Given these variables, we use Equation (12) to determine the market value of total assets A_{t+} , which then determines fire sale costs and the asset allocation.²⁷

We assume that policyholders do not immediately reinvest surrender payouts in the same assets that insurers sell.²⁸ Instead, there may be a significant time lag between surrenders and re-investments, or policyholders may invest in different assets (e.g., because of different risk preferences) or consume (e.g., by using the surrender payout as an alternative to loans). For example, we document a positive correlation between surrender payouts and private consumption in Germany in Internet Appendix E. Since the price impact in Equation (11) is linear in the volume of sales, it is, however, straightforward to relax this assumption: if policyholders immediately reinvested $x\%$ of surrender payouts in the same assets that insurers sell, the price impact would be $x\%$ smaller.

²⁷We numerically solve Equation (12), selecting the solution with minimal fire sale costs.

²⁸Note that, upon an interest rate rise, insurers' depreciated long-term investments restrict them from offering new contracts with higher returns to existing policyholders.

4.2 Results

We simulate 20,000 paths of the main model with a length of 10 years in Matlab. The dynamics of simulated interest rates and stock prices closely resemble those historically observed (as illustrated in Figure IA.4 in Internet Appendix D.6). To assess the risk posed by surrender options in an environment with rising interest rates, among all simulated paths we focus on the 5% with the largest average increase in the 10-year German government bond rate. Among these paths with rising rates, on average, interest rates increase annually by 25 bps. This pace is plausible compared to the historical evolution of bond rates and matches the 75th percentile of annual changes in the 10-year German government bond rate since 1980. To compute the present value of the contract m_{t-1}^h in Equation (6), at each date on each of the simulated paths with rising rates, we simulate 10 paths with a length of 40 years, yielding an overall computation effort in the order of $0.05 \times 20,000 \times 10 \times 10 \times 40 = 4,000,000$ simulated balance sheets.

In the following, we describe the results focusing on the mean outcome across the interest rate rise paths. In addition, we report 25th and 75th percentiles, which illustrate the variation in outcomes implied by the calibrated volatility of interest rates, surrender decisions and mortality.

4.2.1 Slow Pass-Through of Interest Rate Changes. Figure 3 (a) depicts the dynamics of market interest rates, the guaranteed rate for new contracts, and the insurer's realized investment return (before depreciations). Although the simulated 10-year German government bond rate steadily increases over time, the insurer's investment return slightly

decreases. The reason for this divergence is the long duration of the insurer's investments. If the insurer keeps fixed portfolio weights, old long-term bonds with historically high yields are gradually replaced by new bonds with relatively lower (yet increasing) yields. Instead, under duration matching, the insurer accommodates a shorter liability duration by substituting long-term with short-term bonds. Then, on the one hand, coupon rates more swiftly respond to rising rates. On the other hand, as higher rates reduce the market value of the initial long-term bond portfolio, substituting with short-term bonds leads to lower face values. These effects (partly) offset each other and, as a result, investment returns with duration matching are only slightly higher than with fixed portfolio weights. Overall, there is a slow pass-through of higher interest rates to the insurer's investment return.

Figure 3. Interest Rates and Contract Returns.

Figure (a) depicts the mean and 25th and 75th percentiles of the 10-year German government bond rate, the guaranteed return for new contracts, and the insurer's investment return for the duration-matching and fixed-duration investment strategies. The investment return is computed as the ratio of investment income without considering depreciations relative to the insurer's lagged book value of assets. Figure (b) depicts the mean and 25th and 75th percentiles of the realized contract return of the average cohort and the expected future profit participation rate, i.e., $\mathbb{E} \left[\frac{1}{T^h - h} \sum_{\tau=1}^{T^h - h} \tilde{r}_{t+\tau}^* \right]$, for the duration-matching and fixed-portfolio-weights investment strategies.





Figure 3(b) depicts the realized contract return to policyholders as well as the average future profit participation rate. Consistent with the evolution of investment returns, contract

returns also decrease over time, with higher returns if the insurer adopts duration matching rather than fixed portfolio weights. The strong co-movement of investment and contract returns is intuitive because, during an interest rate rise, existing contracts have relatively low guaranteed returns (implied by initially low interest rates), which, thus, are often not binding.²⁹ In contrast to realized contract returns, expected future profit participation rates (and, thus, future contract returns) increase over time. This reflects future re-investments of the insurer's assets at higher rates. Nonetheless, the average annual increase in expected future profit participation of 9 bps does not keep up with the average annual increase in interest rates of approximately 25 bps.

Figure 4. Surrender Rate.

The figure depicts the mean and 25th and 75th percentiles of the share of surrendered contracts weighted by their cash value V_t^h for the duration-matching and fixed-portfolio-weights investment strategies.



4.2.2 Interest Rate Convexity. The investment return dynamics strengthen policyholders' incentives to surrender. As a result, the average surrender rate increases from 3.7%

²⁹Whereas the figure depicts the investment return at book value before accounting for asset depreciations (which occur when market values fall below historical cost values), contract returns follow the investment return *after* depreciations (see Equation (4)). Depreciations may thus reduce contract returns below the investment return (before depreciations).

at model begin to 5.8% after 10 years of rising interest rates (see Figure 4).³⁰ A surrender rate of 5.8% corresponds to the 73th percentile of the pooled distribution of German life insurers’ surrender rates from 1996 to 2019. It is significantly below a surrender rate of 20-25%, which according to Biagini et al. (2021) would constitute a “mass cancellation scenario”, and below 40%, which is assumed to reflect a mass cancellation scenario in European insurance regulation. Figure 4 also shows that by shortening the duration of assets when following a duration matching strategy, the insurer reduces surrender incentives, consistent with higher expected future profit participation rates.

The increase in surrender rates reduces the interest rate duration of individual insurance contracts when interest rates rise (see Figure 5 (a)). Thus, surrender options contribute to life insurance convexity. This effect on the contract portfolio’s duration is amplified by cross-sectional heterogeneity in surrender rates: young cohorts are particularly interest rate sensitive, and thus, their comparatively high surrender rates reduce their weight within the insurer’s contract portfolio. As a consequence, older cohorts with a shorter duration gain in weights and further reduce the *average* duration in the contract portfolio. These effects interact with differences in size across cohorts, which can mitigate or further boost the decline in duration.

To isolate the impact of interest-rate-sensitive surrenders, we compare our results to a counterfactual calibration in which the insurer keeps investment portfolio weights constant

³⁰Note that the correlation between surrender rates and interest rates is larger in the simulations than in the empirical analysis in Section 3. The reason is that the model starts at a particularly low level of interest rates after a long period of declining interest rates, which implies that low contract returns and low guarantees amplify the interest rate sensitivity of surrender rates (see Inequality (7)). Supporting this explanation, in additional regressions with the sample from Section 3 we find that $Interest\ rates_{t-1}^2$ enters with a significantly negative coefficient, which implies that a lower interest rate associates with a larger interest rate sensitivity.

and the surrender rate is held constant at the level of the initial surrender rate for each policyholder, i.e., it does not react to changes in interest rates. In this counterfactual calibration, the duration of contracts decreases due to baseline and portfolio effects, as the contract portfolio shifts from younger contracts with longer duration to older contracts with shorter duration. The average modified duration of the contract portfolio then declines from 13.9 years at $t = 0$ to 8.5 years at $t = 10$.

In our baseline calibration, the interest rate sensitivity of surrender rates amplifies the decline in contract duration. In this case, the modified duration declines to 8.2 years at $t = 10$. The difference from the counterfactual calibration with a constant surrender rate combines two effects: (1) reallocation of cash flows *within* contracts, as higher surrender rates reduce contracts' expected lifetime, and (2) changing portfolio composition, as younger contracts are relatively more interest rate sensitive and, thus, have higher surrender rates, increasing the relative size of older contracts. As a result, the overall duration of the contract portfolio declines by an additional 0.3 years (or, equivalently, 4%) in comparison to the counterfactual calibration.

With duration matching, the insurer adjusts the duration of assets to decline in line with the decline in the duration of liabilities. In the counterfactual calibration with fixed portfolio weights, the asset duration stays constant, whereas the duration of liabilities drops more, namely by 7% relative to the calibration with fixed surrender rates. Thus, approximately half of the impact of interest rate sensitivity of surrenders on liability duration is offset by the duration matching investment strategy.

4.2.3 Free Cash Flow and Asset Sales. Higher surrender rates translate into larger surrender payouts to policyholders. These payouts negatively affect the insurer’s free cash flow, as Figure 5 (b) shows. In the counterfactual calibration with constant surrender rates and fixed portfolio weights, the free cash flow remains above 2% of total assets. Instead, interest-rate-sensitive surrender rates reduce the free cash flow to 1% as the insurer faces higher surrender payouts. In the baseline calibration, duration matching by the insurer has two main effects; it reduces surrender rates and increases coupon rates. As a result, the free cash flow increases over time to more than 10% of total assets.

Figure 5. Duration and Free Cash Flow.

Figure (a) depicts the mean of the modified duration of the insurer’s fixed-income investment portfolio (dashed blue lines) and of the insurer’s contract portfolio (black straight and dotted lines). Asset duration dynamics do not differ across calibrations with constant or dynamic surrender rates. Figure (b) depicts the insurer’s free cash flow before accounting for fire sale costs relative to lagged total assets. Both figures distinguish between a constant surrender rate λ with fixed asset duration and a dynamic surrender rate λ (endogenously determined depending on the market environment) with either a duration-matching or fixed-portfolio-weights investment strategy.





Figure 6 illustrates the insurer’s asset sales by asset class, comparing duration matching with fixed portfolio weights. We compute the volume of asset sales in asset class k as $\text{Sales}_{k,t} = \max\{-(w_t^k A_{t+} - a_{t-}^k), 0\}$. In the counterfactual calibration with fixed portfolio

weights, the insurer sells short-term bonds because longer-term bond prices decline relative to those of shorter-term bonds when interest rates increase. To counteract this shift in relative prices and to maintain constant portfolio weights (in market values), the insurer sells short-term bonds. Instead, with duration matching, the insurer sells long-term bonds to reduce the duration of assets, matching the declining duration of insurance contracts. Moreover, the timing of asset sales differs between investment strategies. Whereas the volume of asset sales steadily increases over time with fixed portfolio weights, with duration matching, asset sales peak in the early years of an interest rate rise.

Figure 6. Asset Sales across Asset Classes.

The figures depict the mean ratio of asset sales to previous year’s total assets for each year and asset class, where short-term bonds are those with a maturity of up to 10 years and long-term bonds are those with a maturity larger than 10 years. Figure (a) is based on the baseline calibration with duration matching and Figure (b) is based on the calibration with fixed portfolio weights. Average sales of short-term bonds are zero in Figure (a) and those of long-term bonds are zero in Figure (b).




Total asset sales reach significant amounts. In the baseline calibration, the volume of total asset sales peaks at close to 2% of total assets (Figure 7 (a)).³¹ To assess the price impact

³¹Note that the level of $Sales_t = \sum_k Sales_{k,t}$ depends on the level of market segmentation. The more segmented the market, the larger is the sum of segment-level net sales. By assuming segmentation of the bond market into only two segments, our results are conservative relative to the actual segmentation of markets in practice. Kubitzka (2025) provides empirical evidence for more granular segmentation at the bond issuer level.

of asset sales, we compute the volume-weighted average price impact, $\sum_{k \in \mathcal{K}} \text{Price impact}_t^k \cdot \text{Sales}_t^k / \sum_{k \in \mathcal{K}} \text{Sales}_t^k$ (following the definitions in Equation (11)), which reflects the average price impact per EUR 1 sold.³² In the baseline calibration, the insurer's asset sales depress prices by up to 70 bps. The magnitude of this price impact is economically significant. For example, Massa and Zhang (2021) document that nonfinancial firms reacted to corporate bond price declines of approximately 50 bps by adjusting their debt structure after hurricane Katrina forced insurance companies to sell bonds. In the counterfactual calibration with fixed portfolio weights, the volume of asset sales is similar in magnitudes whereas the price impact is slightly smaller (up to 60 bps) because asset sales peak in later years, in which the insurer's balance sheet is smaller. Thus, despite differences in asset composition, the investment strategy has a small impact on aggregate sales.

Figure 7. Asset Sales and Price Impact.

Both figures depict the mean and 25th and 75th percentiles of the insurer's asset sales relative to the previous year's total assets for a constant surrender rate λ and dynamic surrender rate λ (endogenously determined depending on the market environment) as well as the mean price impact per EUR 1 sold with a dynamic surrender rate λ , defined as the average asset class-specific price impact (see Equation 11) weighted by the asset-class-specific volume of sales. Figure (a) is for the investment strategy with duration matching and Figure (b) for that with fixed portfolio weights.



³²Market segmentation implies that purchases in one asset class cannot offset the price impact in another asset class.

To what extent are asset sales driven by the interest rate sensitivity of surrender options? To answer this question, Figure 7 compares asset sales with interest-rate-sensitive surrender rates to those in the counterfactual calibration with a constant surrender rate. The difference between the amount of sales and their price impact in the counterfactual and baseline calibration reflects the impact of interest-rate-sensitive surrenders. These *surrender-driven* asset sales account for more than half of total asset sales in the baseline calibration (up to 63%). Additionally, we also compute the *surrender-driven* price impact as the difference between the price impact in the baseline calibration (Figure 7) and that with a constant surrender rate (unreported). With duration matching, the *surrender-driven* price impact reaches 31 bps, emphasizing the potential spillovers of surrender dynamics to financial markets.

4.2.4 Market Value Adjustments. Surrender values are guaranteed ex ante in Germany, i.e., independent of short-term fluctuations in interest rates. Instead, market value adjustments (MVAs), typically found in the U.S., adjust surrender values for interest rate changes: an increase in interest rates reduces market-value-adjusted surrender values, everything else being equal. At the same time, MVAs increase surrender values when interest rates decrease.

In a counterfactual calibration detailed in Internet Appendix G, we implement an MVA. The MVA significantly reduces the surrender rate by up to 29% (1.7 ppt) as interest rates rise, owing to lower surrender values and, thus, weakened surrender incentives. As a result, the MVA reduces convexity, i.e., rising interest rates depress the duration of liabilities less with an MVA than without.

Whether this reduction in convexity translates into lower asset sales or a lower price

impact depends on the insurer’s investment strategy. When the insurer keeps portfolio weights fixed, we find that the MVA reduces asset sales by up to 40% and the peak price impact to below 50 bps. The reason is that the lower surrender rates raise the insurer’s free cash flow, reducing the need to sell assets.

Instead, when the insurer follows a duration-matching investment strategy, using MVAs does neither reduce asset sales nor the price impact despite a similar effect on surrender rates. The reason is that the insurer still rebalances a significant amount of its investment portfolio to match the time-varying duration of liabilities even when there is less convexity. Thus, while MVAs reduce the convexity of life insurance contracts, their impact on portfolio dynamics is not unambiguous and duration matching itself remains an important driver of asset sales.

5 Empirical Predictions and Policy Implications

Our analysis sheds light on the interaction between interest rates, surrender options, and liquidity risk in life insurance. Thereby, it makes several empirical predictions.

First, we quantify the interest rate convexity in life insurance savings contracts. In our baseline calibration, surrender options depress the duration of life insurance contracts by 2% to 4% during an interest rate rise of 25 bps per year. This *convexity* is consistent with empirical evidence on the interest rate sensitivity of life insurers’ equity prices. For example, [Hartley et al. \(2017\)](#), [Ozdagli and Wang \(2020\)](#), and [Grochola \(2023\)](#) document that life insurers’ equity prices are relatively less interest rate sensitive when interest rates are higher, consistent with a then lower duration of life insurance contracts and, thus, lower duration

gap. Life insurance convexity implies that it can be optimal for life insurers to maintain a negative duration gap to reduce their exposure to an interest rate rise, a characteristic of life insurers observed in many markets.³³

Second, convexity incentivizes insurers to reduce the duration of their investments during an interest rate rise to match changes in contract duration (Ozdagli and Wang, 2020). A collective rebalancing can induce upward pressure on long-term relative to short-term yields, analogous to the effect of prepayment options for fixed-rate mortgages (Hanson, 2014). This prediction is consistent with the results in Domanski et al. (2015), who document that German life insurers increase their investments' duration when interest rates decline and that the resulting demand for long-term bonds further reduces long-term yields.

Third, counterfactual calibrations highlight the interplay between insurers' investment strategy and the impact of surrenders on asset sales. Duration matching implies that insurers sell long-term bonds to accommodate shorter liability durations, whereas insurers would sell mostly short-term bonds when targeting fixed portfolio weights. Thus, the degree to which insurers engage in duration matching is an important determinant for insurers' price impact along the yield curve.

Fourth, whereas duration matching stabilizes the insurers' cash flows, our results also show that surrender dynamics can reduce the insurers' free cash flow to and below zero³⁴, *forcing* the insurer to liquidate assets in addition to portfolio rebalancing. The surrender-driven pressure to sell assets adds to margin calls on interest rate swaps driven by higher

³³Note that negative duration gaps, however, increase insurers' exposure to an interest rate decline. Thus, the appropriate duration gap significantly depends on an insurer's expectations about future interest rate changes.

³⁴In Figure 5, the probability of a negative free cash flow is strictly positive in years $t \geq 6$ and exceeds 10% at $t \geq 8$ if the insurer maintains fixed portfolio weights (with dynamic surrender rates).

rates (De Jong et al., 2019; Alfaro et al., 2024; Jansen et al., 2024).

Because asset sales can amplify market instabilities, an important question is how to mitigate the interest rate sensitivity of surrender rates. The primary reason for interest rate sensitivity is that surrender values do not adjust to interest rates in the short run. Therefore, allowing surrender values to fluctuate with asset prices can reduce the interest rate sensitivity of surrenders. Market value adjustments (MVAs) adjust surrender values to interest rate changes by comparing the current and past levels of interest rates and, thereby, mitigate a surge in surrenders when interest rates rise. However, we find that the impact of MVAs crucially depends on the insurer’s investment strategy. MVAs substantially reduce asset sales if insurers keep fixed portfolio weights, while they have little effect on asset sales if the insurer matches the duration of assets to that of liabilities. Therefore, the use of MVAs as a policy tool may be limited, depending on their calibration and the investment strategy of insurers.³⁵

Instead, policymakers have suggested the use of surrender penalties and payout limits to mitigate surrender-driven risks to life insurers’ liquidity and financial stability (e.g., EIOPA, 2020).³⁶ Surrender penalties reduce the *average* level of surrender rates. Thus, such penalties are also costly for policyholders when there is no risk of forced asset sales. Whereas a limit to surrender payouts can reduce asset sales resulting from fundamentals-driven surrenders, it may also strengthen strategic complementarities in the actions of policyholders giving rise to non-fundamental surrender incentives. Moreover, limiting surrender payouts

³⁵MVAs are common in U.S. deferred annuities, but not in most European life insurance markets. A potential explanation is that it is individually optimal for European life insurers not to offer MVAs because the liquidity insurance provided by guaranteed surrender values is highly valued by European households.

³⁶For instance, French regulation allows supervisors to temporarily suspend surrender payouts to strengthen financial stability.

can impose significant costs on policyholders with high liquidity needs. It is thus important to investigate the potential costs and benefits of these policy tools in future work.

6 Conclusion

Surrender options allow life insurance policyholders to terminate their contracts before maturity and receive an ex ante guaranteed surrender value. When interest rates rise, this option moves toward the money and, thus, policyholders have stronger incentives to surrender. Thus, surrender options amplify the convexity of life insurance contracts, namely the decline in their duration when interest rates rise.

We empirically document the impact of interest rates on surrenders in a large panel of German life insurers. Using U.S. monetary policy surprises as an instrument for German government bond rates, we provide causal evidence that higher interest rates raise surrender rates. Exploiting heterogeneity in surrender incentives across insurance companies, we argue that this effect is due to surrender options moving toward the money.

A sufficiently strong increase in surrender rates can lead to asset sales due to a negative free cash flow or by matching the duration of assets to that of liabilities, thereby generating downward pressure on asset prices. We calibrate a granular model to estimate surrender-driven asset sales and their price impact. If insurers match the duration of their investments to that of insurance contracts, they predominantly sell long-term rather than short-term assets. These asset sales peak shortly after interest rates begin to rise. Instead, if insurers keep fixed portfolio weights, then mostly short-term assets are sold and the volume of asset sales increases over time. These results highlight insurers' investment strategy as an important

determinant of the level, timing, and allocation of surrender-driven asset sales.

We discuss several empirical predictions of our model and policy implications, and highlight the costs and benefits of potential policy tools to mitigate collective surrender-driven asset sales.

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Internet Appendix for *Life Insurance Convexity*^{*}

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^{*}The views expressed in this paper are the authors' and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Central Bank or the Eurosystem.

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A Surrender Options in the U.S.

In the U.S., surrender payouts (including full and partial withdrawals) are similarly large as in Europe, amounting to EUR 308 billion (equivalently, \$345 billion) in 2019, which corresponds to roughly 44% of total life insurance payouts (NAIC, 2020). U.S. life insurance products with cash value also entail surrender options. These products include universal life and whole life insurance as well as variable and deferred annuities (Berends et al., 2013).

For individual deferred annuities, the surrender value is mandated to correspond to at least 87.5% of the accumulated gross cash value up to the surrender date and additional interest credits less surrender charges (NAIC, 2017). Similar to German life insurance policies, the guaranteed minimum interest rate is determined at contract origination.¹ Therefore, there exists a minimum guaranteed surrender value that is independent of market developments.

For multi-year deferred annuities, the surrender value is typically subject to a market value adjustment (MVA), at least in the first contract years. This can cause both upward and downward changes based on market developments (NAIC, 2021). The MVA compares interest rates at contract origination with rates at the surrender date. If interest rates have increased (decreased) during the active contract period, the effect of the MVA on the surrender value will be negative (positive), i.e., the policyholder will receive relatively less (more).

Variable annuities come with a broad flexibility for policyholders to decide on the underlying investment (typically mutual funds) and on guarantee components (Kojen and Yogo, 2022). Depending on the chosen financial guarantee, surrender values may react less sensitive to an interest rate rise than the underlying investment, which strengthens surrender incentives similarly as for the contracts we study in our model.

Surrender penalties for U.S. life insurance contracts are typically up to 10% of the con-

¹The guaranteed minimum interest rate must be between 1 and 3% and, within this range, depends on the five-year U.S. Constant Maturity Treasury yield reduced by 125 bps (NAIC, 2017).

tract's cash value in the first year and then decrease by 100 bps annually. Often, 10% of the cash value can be withdrawn without a penalty in the first contract years.

B Anecdotal Evidence

Anecdotal evidence emphasizes the interaction of market interest rates, surrender options, and life insurers' liquidity risk. We highlight three historical examples. First, in response to rising U.S. market interest rates in the late 1970s and early 1980s, U.S. surrender rates increased sharply from roughly 3% in 1951 to 12% in 1985 (Kuo et al., 2003). As a result, U.S. life insurers liquidated a large share of their investments (Russell et al., 2013).

Second, the surrender of guaranteed investment contracts (GICs), which are savings contracts with financial guarantees resembling modern savings contracts, significantly contributed to U.S. life insurer failures in the 1990s (Brewer et al., 1993; Jackson and Symons, 1999; Brennan et al., 2013). Rising interest rates in particular sparked mass surrenders of GICs sold by *General American*, a U.S. life insurer, resulting in its failure in 1999 (Fabozzi, 2000; Brennan et al., 2013).

Third, rising interest rates also triggered large surrenders in South Korea in 1997–1998. As interest rates sharply rose (by approximately 4 ppt for 5-year government bonds within a few months), annualized surrender rates increased from 11% to 54.2% for long-term savings contracts, and life insurers' gross premium income fell by 26%. Life insurers were forced to liquidate assets, and approximately one-third of them exited the market (Geneva Association, 2012).

C Empirical Analysis: Data and Additional Results

C.1 Data

Table IA.1. Variable definitions and data sources.

Note: *BaFin* refers to data retrieved from the “Erstversicherungsstatistik” of the German financial supervisory authority *BaFin*, available either in print or online at https://www.bafin.de/DE/PublikationenDaten/Statistiken/Erstversicherung/erstversicherung_artikel.html. *GDV* refers to data shared with us by the German association of insurers.

| Variable | Definition |
|---------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Insurer-Year level | |
| Surrender rate | Fraction of life insurance contracts surrendered weighted by contract volume (<i>Source: BaFin</i>) |
| New business | Volume of new insurance business relative to that of total insurance business at the previous year’s end (<i>Source: BaFin</i>) |
| Year level | |
| Interest rate | 10-year German government bond rate (<i>Source: Bundesbank</i>) |
| Guaranteed return | Annually guaranteed minimum return for new German life insurance contracts (<i>Source: http://gdv.de</i>) |
| Contract return | Average market-wide realized contract return for traditional endowment contracts in Germany (<i>Source: Assekurata</i>) |
| log(New German contracts) | Logarithm of the number of new German life insurance contracts (<i>Source: GDV</i>) |
| New term life | Fraction of new term life insurance contracts relative to all new life insurance contracts in Germany (<i>Source: GDV</i>) |
| Inflation | Annual change in German CPI (<i>Source: BIS</i>) |
| GDP growth | Annual change in German GDP (<i>Source: OECD</i>) |
| Investment growth | Annual change in German investment (<i>Source: OECD</i>) |
| Crisis | Indicator for banking crises (<i>Source: Laeven and Valencia (2018)</i>) |
| MoPoSurp | End-of-year cumulative U.S. monetary policy shocks, computed as the sum of past monetary policy surprises (since 1990), which are defined following Jarocinski and Karadi (2020) as the first principal component of the surprises in interest rate derivatives with maturities from 1 month to 1 year, which are measured as described in Gürkaynak et al. (2005) (<i>Source: http://marekjarocinski.github.io</i>) |
| Pure MoPoSurp | End-of-year cumulative U.S. monetary policy shocks (since 1990) purged of central bank information shocks with simple (“Poor Man’s”) sign restrictions as described by Jarocinski and Karadi (2020) (<i>Source: http://marekjarocinski.github.io</i>) |


Continued on next page

Table IA.1 – *Continued from previous page*

| Variable | Definition |
|---------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| CB InfoSurp | End-of-year cumulative U.S. central bank information shocks (since 1990) obtained using simple (“Poor Man’s”) sign restrictions as described by Jarociński and Karadi (2020) (Source: http://marekjarocinski.github.io) |
| %U.S. Imports | U.S. Imports of Goods by Customs Basis from Germany / (U.S. Imports of Goods by Customs Basis from Germany + U.S. Exports of Goods by F.A.S. Basis to Germany) (Source: <i>FRED St. Louis</i>) |

Figure IA.1. German government bond rates and U.S. monetary policy surprises.

The figure plots the evolution of the 10-year German government bond rate (left axis), cumulative monetary policy surprises (right axis), and pure cumulative monetary policy surprises (right axis), which are purged from central bank information surprises following [Jarocinski and Karadi \(2020\)](#), from 1995 to 2018.



When processing data from BaFin’s Erstversicherungsstatistik, we use the following conventions:

1. We translate values from the historical German currency (“Deutsche mark”) to the euro for the years 1995 to 2000 using the official exchange rate 1 EUR = 1.95583 Deutsche marks.
2. We infer the overall surrender rate for years $t \leq 2015$ (for which it is not directly reported) as

$$\bar{\lambda}_{i,t} = \frac{\text{insurance in force}_{i,t-1} \cdot \lambda_{i,t}^{\text{late}} + \text{new business}_{i,t-1} \cdot \lambda_{i,t}^{\text{early}}}{(\text{insurance in force}_{i,t-1} + \text{insurance in force}_{i,t})/2},$$

where $\text{insurance in force}_{i,t-1}$ is insurance in force at year-end $t - 1$ or, equivalently, insurance in force at year-begin t of insurer i , and $\lambda_{i,t}^{\text{early}}$ and $\lambda_{i,t}^{\text{late}}$ are the surrender rates for new and old business, respectively.

3. The late surrender rate is defined as the share of the total sum insured of contracts that are (partially or fully) surrendered and involve a positive surrender payout (including

lapses, on which policyholders stop paying premiums but retain a positive sum insured) relative to the total sum insured at year begin. The variable is available until 2015.

4. The early surrender rate is defined as the share of the total sum insured of contracts that are prematurely terminated and do not involve a positive surrender payment or a positive sum insured remaining (which predominantly applies to new contracts) relative to the total sum insured of newly sold contracts. The variable is available until 2015.

To construct the annual German government bond rate, we retrieve end-of-month yields from the German Bundesbank and take annual averages.

C.2 Additional Results

Table IA.2. Surrender Rates and Interest Rates: Robustness with Average Future Contract Return.

This table estimates the specifications from Table 2, controlling for the average contract return in future years $t + 1$ and $t + 2$, denoted $\text{Contract return}_{t+(1:2)}$. t -statistics are shown in brackets, based on standard errors that are clustered at the insurer level. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level.

| Dependent variable: | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------|---------------------|--------------------|--------------------|---------------------|
| | Surrender rate $_{i,t}$ | | | | | |
| | OLS | | IV | | | |
| Sample: | Full | Young contracts | Full | Young contracts | Full | |
| Interest rate $_{t-1}$ | 0.25*** [4.36] | 0.60** [2.24] | | 0.10 [0.92] | 0.88** [2.16] | |
| Contract return $_{t+(1:2)}$ | -0.01 [-0.07] | -0.27 [-1.63] | | 0.12 [1.07] | -0.13 [-0.54] | |
| Interest rate $_{t-1} \times \text{Guarantee}_{t-1}$ | | -0.16* [-1.97] | | | -0.28** [-1.99] | |
| Guarantee $_{t-1}$ | | 1.16*** [3.89] | | | 1.41*** [3.90] | |
| Interest rate $_{t-1} \times \text{Guarantee}_{t-1} \times \text{New business}_{i,t-1}$ | | | -0.02*** [-3.93] | | | -0.02*** [-3.34] |
| Macro controls | Y | Y | | Y | Y | |
| New business $_{i,t-1}$ | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| Interest rate $_{t-1} \times \text{New business}_{i,t-1}$ | | | Y | | | Y |
| Guarantee $_{t-1} \times \text{New business}_{i,t-1}$ | | | Y | | | Y |
| Insurer FE | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| Year FE | | | Y | | | Y |
| First stage | | | | | | |
| MoPoSurp $_{t-1}$ | | | | 1.12*** [45.33] | 2.85*** [37.30] | |
| MoPoSurp $_{t-1} \times \text{Guarantee}_{t-1} \times \text{New business}_{i,t-1}$ | | | | | | 0.47** [2.45] |
| F Statistic | | | | 707 | 152 | 237 |
| No. of obs. | 2,251 | 1,121 | 2,251 | 2,251 | 1,121 | 2,251 |
| No. of insurers | 160 | 137 | 160 | 160 | 137 | 160 |

Table IA.3. Surrender Rates and Interest Rates: Robustness.

This table presents estimates from regressions of insurer-level annual surrender rates on the 10-year German government bond rate from 1996 to 2019. Columns (1) to (4) are based on the model

$$\text{Surrender rate}_{i,t} = \alpha \text{Interest rate}_{t-1} + \beta \text{New business}_{i,t-1} + \xi Y_{t-1} + u_i + \varepsilon_{i,t}.$$

Column (1) uses pure monetary policy surprises as an instrument for 10-year German government bond rates and additionally controls for central bank information shocks. Column (2) uses the 10-year U.S. treasury rate as an instrument for 10-year German government bond rates. Columns (3) and (4) present reduced-form estimates. Columns (1) to (3) control for the lagged share of U.S. imports from Germany relative to the sum of U.S. imports and U.S. exports from/to Germany in addition to the controls in Table 2. Column (4) additionally controls for the 10-year German government bond rate. Columns (5) and (6) regress annual changes in surrender rates on annual changes in the 10-year German government bond rate, both from $t-1$ to t , in the following specification:

$$\Delta \text{Surrender rate}_{i,t} = \alpha \Delta \text{Interest rate}_t + \beta \Delta \text{New business}_{i,t-1} + \xi \Delta Y_{t-1} + u_i + \varepsilon_{i,t}.$$


$1\{\Delta \text{Interest rate}_t > 0\}$ is an indicator for an increase in the 10-year German government bond rate from $t-1$ to t . The sample is at the insurer-by-year level from 1996 to 2019. Y_{t-1} is a vector with the same macroeconomic control variables as in Table 2. Detailed variable definitions and data sources are reported in the Internet Appendix. t -statistics are shown in brackets, based on standard errors that are clustered at the insurer level. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level.

| Dependent variable: | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|--------------------|--------------------|-------------------------|--------------------|
| | Surrender rate | | | | Δ Surrender rate | |
| | IV | | OLS | | | |
| Interest rate _{$t-1$} | 0.224*** [3.21] | 0.291*** [5.54] | | 0.315*** [5.73] | | |
| CB InfoSurp _{$t-1$} | 0.115 [0.40] | | | | | |
| %U.S. Imports _{$t-1$} | 1.289 [0.86] | 2.500 [1.35] | -1.700 [-1.37] | | | |
| MoPoSurp _{$t-1$} | | | 0.337*** [4.01] | -0.162 [-1.24] | | |
| Δ Interest rate _{t} | | | | | 0.166*** [4.41] | 0.144** [2.07] |
| $1\{\Delta \text{Interest rate}_t > 0\} \times \Delta \text{Interest rate}_t$ | | | | | | 0.515*** [2.61] |
| $1\{\Delta \text{Interest rate}_t > 0\}$ | | | | | | -0.145 [-1.55] |
| Macro controls | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| New business _{$i,t-1$} | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| Insurer FE | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| First stage | | | | | | |
| Pure MoPoSurp _{$t-1$} | 2.25*** [182.11] | | | | | |
| U.S. treasury rate _{$t-1$} | | 0.97*** [248.09] | | | | |
| F Statistic | 4,376 | 5,696 | | | | |
| No. of obs. | 2,251 | 2,251 | 2,251 | 2,251 | 2,064 | 2,064 |
| No. of insurers | 160 | 160 | 160 | 160 | 151 | 151 |

D Model and Calibration Details

Figure IA.2. Illustration of Key Model Ingredients and Dynamics.

The financial market model determines asset prices and, in particular, government bond rates, which determine the guaranteed return for the new cohort of contracts in year h , r_G^h . Jointly with the insurer's investment portfolio, asset prices also determine the insurer's investment income R_t^{inv} . A fraction ν of the investment income is passed on to policyholders. The maximum of the guaranteed return and the policyholder's fraction of the investment income determines the contract return \tilde{r}_P , which drives the dynamics of life insurance contracts' cash value V_t^h . The cash value determines the surrender value SV_t^h . Surrender decisions are based on comparing SV_t^h with the present value of the contract m_t^h , resulting in the surrender rate λ_t^h . Cash values also determine the size of surrendered and matured contracts. Contract portfolio dynamics are jointly determined by the volume of terminated, matured, and new contracts, reflected in the number of policyholders N_t^h of cohort h . Contracts may be terminated either due to surrenders, upon which the surrender value is paid, or policyholder death, upon which a fixed death benefit is paid. The insurer's total free cash flow is given by the sum of investment income and premiums net of cash outflows due to terminated and matured contracts. Excess cash is reinvested, whereas a negative free cash flow forces the insurer to sell assets. Asset sales reduce asset prices and, thereby, negatively impact the funds available for reinvestment.




D.1 Calibration of Surrender Decisions

We calibrate the model of contract surrenders by exploiting the cross-sectional distribution of German life insurance surrender rates in the Erstversicherungsstatistik (described in Section 3). The first period of simulated surrenders in our model (between year-ends $t = 0$ and

$t = 1$) corresponds to the year 2016. Because the Erstversicherungsstatistik separately includes early and late surrender rates only until 2015, we use data from 2015. In Figure IA.3, we show that the distribution of the insurer-level surrender rate (averaged across all cohorts) is similar in 2015 and 2016, which is consistent with the then very stable German economic environment and interest rates in particular.

Figure IA.3. Distribution of Surrender Rates across German Life Insurers.



We calibrate the model's parameters $\beta = (\beta_0, \beta_1, \beta_2)$ by solving the following optimization problem:

$$\min_{\beta} \left(\sum_{i:\text{low } r_A} \sum_h \frac{\hat{w}_{i,h}}{\sum_{j:\text{low } r_A} \sum_g \hat{w}_{j,g}} \hat{\lambda}_{2015,i}^{\text{early}} - \lambda_1^0(\beta, \delta_{\text{low}}) \right)^2 + \left(\sum_{i:\text{high } r_A} \sum_h \frac{\hat{w}_{i,h}}{\sum_{j:\text{high } r_A} \sum_g \hat{w}_{j,g}} \hat{\lambda}_{2015,i}^{\text{early}} - \lambda_1^0(\beta, \delta_{\text{high}}) \right)^2 \quad (\text{IA.1})$$

$$s.t. \sum_{i,h} \frac{\hat{w}_{i,h}}{\sum_{j,g} \hat{w}_{j,g}} \hat{\lambda}_{2015,i}^h = \sum_h w_h \lambda_1^h(\beta) \quad (\text{IA.2})$$

$$\sum_{i,h} \frac{\hat{w}_{i,h}}{\sum_{j,g} \hat{w}_{j,g}} \hat{\lambda}_{2015,i}^{\text{early}} = \lambda_1^0(\beta). \quad (\text{IA.3})$$

$\sum_{i,h} \frac{\hat{w}_{i,h}}{\sum_{j,g} \hat{w}_{j,g}} \hat{\lambda}_{2015,i}^h$ is the average realized surrender rate across all German life insurers i and cohorts h in 2015 (3.58%). Cohorts as well as insurers are weighted by the total volume of insurance in force at year-begin, $\hat{w}_{i,h}$, of cohort h of insurer i .² (IA.2) requires that the

²Insurance in force (*Versicherungssumme*) is the guaranteed amount to be paid out if the policyholder does not surrender. We compute insurance in force in our model as the sum of guaranteed savings (including

average realized surrender rate coincides with the average surrender rate in the first year of the model, $\lambda_1^h(\beta)$, weighted across cohorts by insurance in force, w_h .

$\hat{\lambda}_{2015,i}^{early}$ is the realized early surrender rate (for young cohorts) of insurer i .³ (IA.3) requires that the average realized early surrender rate (8.56%) coincides with the average surrender rate of the youngest cohort ($h = 0$) in the first year of the model, both weighted by insurance in force.

The objective function (IA.1) minimizes the deviation between model-implied and realized surrender rates when varying the (expected) contract return. Because contract returns are not reported in the Erstversicherungsstatistik and expected future contract returns are not observable, we use information on realized investment returns, $\hat{r}_{A,2015,i}$, instead. We denote by $\Delta = \hat{r}_{P,2015} - \sum_{i,h} \frac{\hat{w}_{i,h}}{\sum_{j,g} \hat{w}_{j,g}} \hat{r}_{A,2015,i}$ the difference between the average contract return in the German life insurance market in 2015 (3.16%) and the volume-weighted average investment return in 2015 (3.51%). We denote by $\{i : \text{low } r_A\}$ the set of life insurers in the 2nd volume-weighted quartile of investment returns and by $\hat{r}_{A,\text{low}} = \sum_{i:\text{low } r_A} \sum_h \frac{\hat{w}_{i,h}}{\sum_{j:\text{low } r_A} \sum_g \hat{w}_{j,g}} \hat{r}_{A,2015,i}$ the volume-weighted average investment return of these insurers (3.31%). The corresponding volume-weighted average early surrender rate is 9.37%. Analogously, we define by $\{i : \text{high } r_A\}$ insurers in the 3rd quartile of investment returns and by $\hat{r}_{A,\text{high}}$ their average investment return (3.83%), with the corresponding volume-weighted average early surrender rate of 6.64%. Then, $\delta_{\text{low}} = \Delta + \hat{r}_{A,\text{low}}$ and $\delta_{\text{high}} = \Delta + \hat{r}_{A,\text{high}}$ approximate the average contract returns of these insurers.⁴ Finally, we compute “shocked” surrender rates by shifting the annual future contract returns in Equation (4) by $\delta_{\text{low}} - \tilde{r}_{P,0}$ (future premiums) and the current one-year mortality component, such that insurance in force in cohort h is equal to

$$V_t^h (1 + r_G^h)^{T^h - t} + N_t^h \sum_{\tau=1}^{T^h - t - 1} (P^h - q_{t+\tau}^h v_m) (1 + r_G^h)^{T^h - t - \tau} + N_t^h v_m. \quad (\text{IA.4})$$

³We truncate $\hat{\lambda}_{2015,i}^{early}$ at 0.3 to remove the impact of outliers.

⁴These estimates are particularly accurate when guaranteed returns are not binding, which is the case in the low-interest rate environment of 2015.

and $\delta_{\text{high}} - \tilde{r}_{P,0}$, while holding all else constant, where $\tilde{r}_{P,0}$ is the contract return in the model in $t = 0$.

The resulting calibration is $\beta = (\beta_0, \beta_1, \beta_2) = (0.0574, 1.0148, 0.365)$.

D.2 Accounting of Insurance Liabilities

Under European statutory accounting following the Solvency II regulation, insurance liabilities reflect the market-consistent value of contracts. For this purpose, insurers compute a *best estimate* of market-consistent contract values. We compute the Solvency II balance sheet mainly to scale our model to the size of European life insurers. We approximate the value of liabilities in cohort h at time t on the Solvency II balance sheet as follows (note that future mortality payouts are covered by future premiums by assumption and, thus, do not enter the present value of liabilities):

$$PV_t^h = V_t^h \left(\sum_{j=1}^{T^h-t} \frac{\vartheta \lambda_t^h (1 - \lambda_t^h)^{j-1} \prod_{\tau=1}^{j-1} (1 - q_{t+\tau-1}^h) (1 + \max\{r_G^h, \hat{r}_{P,t+\tau}^*\})}{(1 + r_{f,t,j-1})^{j-1}} \right. \\ \left. + \frac{(1 - \lambda_t^h)^{T^h-t} \prod_{\tau=1}^{T^h-t} (1 - q_{t+\tau-1}^h) (1 + \max\{r_G^h, \hat{r}_{P,t+\tau}^*\})}{(1 + r_{f,t,T^h-t})^{T^h-t}} \right) + \frac{q_t^h N_t^h v_m}{1 + r_{f,t,1}}. \quad (\text{IA.5})$$

Here, we make two assumptions. The first is that the most recent realized surrender rate λ_t^h in cohort h is used for future years. The second is that the future profit participation rate, $\hat{r}_{P,t+\tau}^h$, is estimated from a log-linear model. In particular, at each year, the profit participation rate \tilde{r}_t^* is fitted to a log-linear model, which is then used to predict future profit participation rate: $\tilde{r}_i^* = \alpha + \beta \log(10 + i - t) + \varepsilon_i$, which is estimated using OLS based on observations from the past 10 years, $i = t - 9, \dots, t$. Then, the predicted profit participation rate is given by $\hat{r}_i^* = \hat{\alpha} + \hat{\beta} \log(10 + i - t)$ for $i > t$.

PV_t^h affects the main results in two ways. First, we calibrate the leverage of the insurer's initial balance sheet based on the value of liabilities implied by PV_t^h . This is the reason

for using the log-linear model above to approximate future profit participation rates rather than simulated future profit participation rates, which require the calibrated balance sheet as input. Second, the insurer defaults if the market value of total assets drops below $\sum_h PV_t^h$, in which case contract returns drop to zero.

D.3 Calibration of the Initial Contract Portfolio

To calibrate the initial cash value of contract cohorts, we use the following data:

- the volume of life insurance savings contracts (“Kapitalversicherungen”) newly issued in year h , N^h , obtained from the German insurance association, GDV (in million EUR)⁵
- the life insurance sector’s surrender rate, $\tilde{\lambda}_t$,
 - 1996–2015: for the median German life insurer (weighted across insurers by contract portfolio size) according to BaFin’s Erstversicherungsstatistik
 - 1976–1995: the average surrender rate reported by the German insurance association, GDV, scaled by the ratio of the BaFin surrender rate to the GDV surrender rate from 1996 to account for differences in the underlying set of life insurers
- the realized contract return of German life insurance contracts
 - 1996–2015: reported by Assekurata, a rating agency for German life insurers⁶
 - 1976–1995: predicted by fitting a linear model to the average contract return reported by Assekurata for 1996–2015 using the 10-year moving average of 5-year German government bond rates reported in the IMF’s International Financial Statistics as explanatory variable (the R^2 is 91%). We use bond rates from the IMF’s statistics because of the long time series available.

⁵We thank the GDV for sharing the data with us.

⁶We thank Assekurata for sharing the data with us.

Since the surrender rate and contract return are not available at the cohort level, we make the following assumptions: (1) within each cohort h , each contract pays a premium of EUR 1 each year if not surrendered or matured, (2) each contract has a lifetime of 40 years at inception, and (3) each contract's surrender rate in year t can be approximated by the average surrender rate $\tilde{\lambda}_t$. However, accumulating contracts since 1976 according to these assumptions must not necessarily arrive at the representative contract portfolio in 2015. Instead, contract dynamics might have deviated due to the presence of single premiums, heterogeneity in the surrender rate and contract return, and time-varying insurance supply.

To evaluate the representativeness of the initial contract portfolio, we use two key portfolio characteristics: the average guaranteed return per contract and the portfolio's modified duration.⁷ Assekurata (2016) reports an average guaranteed return of 2.97% for German life insurers in 2015. The German association of insurers (GDV) reports a modified duration of liabilities of 14.1 for the median insurer and 14.8 for the weighted average in 2013. Following the assumptions above, our initial portfolio would exhibit a much shorter duration. In this case, the portfolio weight of older contracts (with a short remaining time to maturity and, thus, short duration) is too large. To offset this bias, we modify the size of cohorts $h \in \{-39, \dots, 0\}$ as follows:

$$\hat{N}^h = \left[N^h (1 + g \cdot (h + T^h)) \right].$$

The larger the adjustment factor g , the larger is the volume of younger relative to older contracts. This increases the modified duration. We find that $g = 5$ lifts the modified duration

⁷Consistent with EIOPA (2016), we calculate a cohort's modified duration as

$$\frac{1}{(1 + r_{f,t,T^h-t})PV_t^h} \left[V_t^h \left(\sum_{j=1}^{T^h-t} (j-1) \frac{\vartheta \lambda_t^h (1 - \lambda_t^h)^{j-1} \prod_{\tau=1}^{j-1} (1 - q_{t+\tau-1}^h) (1 + \max\{r_G^h, \hat{r}_{P,t+\tau}^*\})}{(1 + r_{f,t,j-1})^{j-1}} \right) + (T^h - t) \frac{(1 - \lambda_t^h)^{T^h-t} \prod_{\tau=1}^{T^h-t} (1 - q_{t+\tau-1}^h) (1 + \max\{r_G^h, \hat{r}_{P,t+\tau}^*\})}{(1 + r_{f,t,T^h-t})^{T^h-t}} \right] + \frac{q_t^h N_t^h v_m}{1 + r_{f,t,1}}$$

to 13.94 years and the average guaranteed return to 3.12%, which are both reasonably close to the empirical moments. Finally, we scale \hat{N}^h by dividing it by $\hat{N}^0/10,000$ such that the implied number of new contracts at $t = 0$ is equal to 10,000.

D.4 Calibration of the Insurer’s Investment Portfolio

We calibrate the insurer’s asset portfolio weights based on [GDV \(2016\)](#), according to which German life insurers held 6.7% in stocks (shares and participating interests) and 3.9% in real estate in 2015. For the corporate bond portfolio weight, we aggregate German life insurers’ investments in 2015 in mortgages (5.8%), loans to credit institutions (9.8%), loans to companies (1%), contract and other loans (0.5%), corporate bonds (10.3%), and subordinated loans and profit participation rights, call money, time and fixed deposits and other bonds and debentures (6.7%), which results in 34.1% and coincides with the fraction of corporate bonds reported by the [EIOPA \(2014\)](#) for German insurers. We allocate the remaining fraction of fixed-income instruments to government bonds (55.3%).

The weights within subportfolios are based on [Berdin et al. \(2017\)](#) and [EIOPA \(2014\)](#) and reported in Table [IA.4](#). We include a large home bias toward German government bonds, which, however, has little impact on our results. Due to the absence of more granular data, we calibrate real estate and stock weights to yield a plausible home bias of 60% for German real estate and stocks and equally distribute the remaining weights.

Bond maturities differ within the insurer’s portfolio, such that within each bond category, the oldest bond is due in 1 year, the youngest government bond is due in 20 years, and the youngest corporate bond is due in 10 years, reflecting the longer duration of government bonds in insurers’ portfolios. Bond coupons are based on the (government or corporate) bond yield at bond issuance.

To calibrate the modified duration of different asset classes, we use 9.3 years as a benchmark duration for the fixed-income portfolio, based on the stress test results in [EIOPA \(2016\)](#).

Table IA.4. Investment Portfolio Allocation.

The table depicts the weights and average modified duration of each asset class in the insurer's investment portfolio. The calibration is based on [EIOPA \(2014, 2016\)](#) and [GDV \(2016\)](#).

| Entire Investment Portfolio | Weight | Duration |
|------------------------------|--------|-------------------|
| Government Bonds | 55.3% | 10.4 |
| Corporate Bonds | 34.1% | 7.5 |
| Stocks | 6.7% | - |
| Real Estate | 3.9% | - |
| Government Bond Portfolio | Weight | Modified Duration |
| German/All Government Bonds | 90.4% | 10.45 |
| French/All Government Bonds | 2.4% | 10.12 |
| Dutch/All Government Bonds | 2.4% | 10.45 |
| Italian/All Government Bonds | 2.4% | 8.03 |
| Spanish/All Government Bonds | 2.4% | 10.45 |
| Corporate Bond Portfolio | Weight | Duration |
| AAA/All Corporates | 23.6% | 7.36 |
| AA/All Corporates | 16.85% | 8.08 |
| A/All Corporates | 33.71% | 7.65 |
| BBB/All Corporates | 25.84% | 7.22 |

Table 6) (9.6 years for 2015) and [EIOPA \(2014\)](#) (8.2 years for 2013). [EIOPA \(2014\)](#) reports an average duration of 9.5 years for government and 6.9 years for corporate bonds for 2013.

We scale these durations up to the average value reported in [EIOPA \(2016, Table 12\)](#) for 2015, implying the scaling factor $\hat{w}_{2015} = \frac{9.3}{(6.9w_{\text{corp}} + 9.5w_{\text{sov}})/(w_{\text{corp}} + w_{\text{sov}})} \approx 1.09$. To calibrate heterogeneity within the government bond portfolio, we use the distribution of the modified duration of government bonds across countries reported in [EIOPA \(2016, Table 13\)](#) and scale these up to match the average government bond portfolio duration of $9.5 \cdot \hat{w}_{2015} = 10.4$. Similarly, to calibrate heterogeneity within the corporate bond portfolio, we use the distribution of modified durations of corporate bonds across ratings reported in [EIOPA \(2016, Table 14\)](#) and scale these up to match the average corporate bond portfolio duration of $6.9 \cdot \hat{w}_{2015} = 7.5$. The final allocation of bonds across ratings is skewed toward higher-rated assets, consistent with those reported by [Assekurata \(2016\)](#).

Given the duration of individual bonds and the target duration of each asset class, we determine portfolio weights following the methodology in [Berdin et al. \(2017\)](#), which assumes that individual bonds' portfolio weights are an exponential function of their remaining time

to maturity, and we correct for potential deviations from the target duration by minimizing the square of the difference between target and actual duration starting with the [Berdin et al. \(2017\)](#)-implied weights.

D.5 Calibration of the Short-Rate Model

Short rate dynamics are given by

$$dr_t = \alpha_r(\theta_r - r_t)dt + \sigma_r dW_t^r, \quad (\text{IA.6})$$

where r_t is the short rate at time t , W_t^r is a standard Brownian motion, $\alpha_r > 0$ is the speed of mean reversion, $\sigma_r > 0$ is the volatility, and θ_r is the level of mean reversion. Under the assumption of arbitrage-free interest rates, Equation [\(IA.6\)](#) specifies the term structure of annually compounded interest rates at time t for maturities τ , $\{r_{f,t,\tau}\}_{\tau \geq 0}$. Following [Brigo and Mercurio \(2006\)](#), the price of a zero-coupon bond at time t with maturity at $t + \tau \geq t$ is

$$(1 + r_{f,t,\tau})^{-\tau} = A(\tau)e[-B(\tau)r_t], \quad (\text{IA.7})$$

where

$$B(\tau) = \frac{1}{\kappa_r} (1 - \exp[-\kappa_r \tau])$$

and

$$A(\tau) = \exp \left[\left(\theta_r - \frac{\sigma_r^2}{2\kappa_r^2} \right) (B(\tau) - \tau) - \frac{\sigma_r^2}{4\kappa_r} B(\tau) \right],$$

and $r_{f,t,\tau}$ is the annually compounded interest rate at time t .

We calibrate the short rate volatility σ_r using a maximum-likelihood estimator based on the monthly Euro OverNight Index Average (EONIA) from December 2000 to November 2015.^{[8](#)} To calibrate κ_r and θ_r , we additionally use the whole term structure of German

⁸EONIA is the weighted rate for the overnight maturity, calculated by collecting data on unsecured

government bond rates. For this purpose, we use the least squares estimate for κ_r and θ_r comparing the term structure for bonds with a maturity from 1 to 20 years implied by the historical evolution of EONIA and the parameters σ_r , κ_r and θ_r with the actual term structure of German government bond rates. The resulting parameters are $\sigma_r = 0.0052$, $\kappa_r = 0.0813$, $\theta_r = 0.018$. The initial level of the short rate is $r_0 = -0.002$, which is the level of EONIA on December 31, 2015.

D.6 Calibration of the Financial Market Model

Spreads for government and corporate bonds are modeled by Ornstein-Uhlenbeck processes, analogously to the short rate,

$$ds_t^j = k^j(\bar{s}^j - s_t^j)dt + \sigma^j dW_t^j. \quad (\text{IA.8})$$

Therefore, $\{r_{f,t,\tau} + s_t^j\}_{\tau \geq 0}$ is the term structure of bonds of type j at time t .

We calibrate bond spreads and stock and real estate returns based on monthly data from December 2000 to November 2015. Corporate bond rates are given by the effective yield of the AAA/AA/A/BBB-subset of the ICE BofAML US Corporate Master Index (obtained from *FRED St. Louis*), which tracks the performance of U.S. dollar-denominated investment-grade rated corporate debt publicly issued in the U.S. domestic market. To account for the different inflation (expectations) between the EU and U.S., we calculate bond spreads with respect to the yield of U.S. treasuries with a maturity of 10 years (obtained from *FRED St. Louis*).⁹ Government bond spreads are calibrated based on the spread relative to German bond rates from December 2000 to November 2015 (obtained from *Thomson Reuters Eikon*), averaged across maturities from 1 to 20 years.

overnight lending in the euro area provided by banks belonging to the EONIA panel. Data source: *ECB Statistical Data Warehouse*.

⁹The results are similar if we take German government bond rates instead.

Table [IA.5](#) describes the sample of bond spreads. Note that we retrieve bond rates (and spreads) for maturities of 1 to 20 years for each government bond, while corporate bond spreads are calculated by comparing the effective yield of the ICE BofAML US Corporate Index to the 10-year yield. We assume that the credit spread is the same across maturities for each bond type and, thus, we calibrate the spread process $\{s_t^j\}_t$ for the average spread across maturities in the case of government bonds. Parameter estimates are based on maximum likelihood and reported in Table [IA.5](#). We assume that coupons are equal to the (government or corporate) bond yield at issuance. Given coupons, we price bonds using the term structure of risk-free rates $r_{f,\tau,t}$ and spreads s_t^j .

Table IA.5. Summary Statistics and Calibration of Bond Spreads.

The table reports summary statistics and maximum-likelihood estimates for the long-term mean (\bar{s}), speed of mean reversion (k), and volatility (σ) of the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process $s^j(t) = k^j(\bar{s}^j - s^j(t))dt + \sigma^j dW^j(t)$ for monthly bond spreads between (a) government bond rates and German government bonds and (b) corporate bond rates and the 10Y U.S. treasury bond rate from December 2000 to November 2015. Government bond rates include observations for 1-year to 20-year maturities, and the calibration is based on the average spread across maturities. Corporate bond spreads are based on the effective yield of ICE BofAML US Corporate Indices and 10-year U.S. treasury rates. *Source: Authors' calculations, Thomson Reuters Eikon (government bonds), FRED St. Louis (corporate bonds).*

| Name | # Observations | Mean | Sd | p25 | p75 | \bar{s} | k | σ |
|---------|----------------|----------|----------|-----------|----------|-----------|--------|----------|
| French | 180 | 0.003188 | 0.003176 | 0.0006895 | 0.004495 | 0.003593 | 0.3574 | 0.00265 |
| Dutch | 180 | 0.002085 | 0.001711 | 0.000651 | 0.003148 | 0.002172 | 0.5086 | 0.001716 |
| Italian | 180 | 0.01158 | 0.01214 | 0.002454 | 0.016 | 0.01375 | 0.2018 | 0.007465 |
| Spanish | 180 | 0.01086 | 0.01343 | 0.000667 | 0.01692 | 0.01493 | 0.1497 | 0.007071 |
| AAA | 180 | 0.003421 | 0.006385 | -0.0005 | 0.0057 | 0.003081 | 1.09 | 0.009236 |
| AA | 180 | 0.004504 | 0.008326 | -0.00065 | 0.0069 | 0.003427 | 0.5738 | 0.008593 |
| A | 180 | 0.009906 | 0.01017 | 0.0046 | 0.01115 | 0.00832 | 0.4922 | 0.009814 |
| BBB | 180 | 0.01847 | 0.01154 | 0.0119 | 0.0215 | 0.0174 | 0.5289 | 0.01164 |

Stocks and real-estate investments follow geometric Brownian motions (GBMs) that are calibrated to the STOXX Europe 600 index and MSCI Europe real estate index, respectively (retrieved from *Thomson Reuters Eikon*). Table [IA.6](#) reports the descriptive statistics for monthly log-returns. We calibrate the GBM drift and volatility with maximum-likelihood estimates for monthly log-returns, which are also reported in Table [IA.6](#). Stocks pay dividends, and real estate investments pay rents at each year's end. Dividends and rents are assumed to equal the maximum of zero and 50% of the annual return.

Table IA.6. Summary Statistics and Calibration for Stocks and Real Estate.

The table reports summary statistics and maximum-likelihood estimates for geometric Brownian motions for monthly stock and real estate returns from December 2000 to November 2015. Stock returns are based on the STOXX Europe 600 index, and real estate returns are based on the MSCI Europe real estate index. *Source: Authors' calculations, Thomson Reuters Eikon.*

| Name | # Observations | Mean | Sd | p25 | p75 | GBM Drift | GBM Volatility |
|-------------|----------------|-----------|---------|----------|---------|-----------|----------------|
| Stocks | 180 | 0.0001462 | 0.04879 | -0.02109 | 0.03055 | 0.01604 | 0.169 |
| Real Estate | 180 | 0.003853 | 0.07032 | -0.03085 | 0.04264 | 0.0759 | 0.2436 |

Finally, we correlate all stochastic processes via a Cholesky decomposition of their diffusion terms. Table [IA.7](#) reports the correlation coefficients based on monthly residuals after fitting bond spreads, stock and real estate returns.


Table IA.7. Correlation Matrix for Financial Market Processes.

The table reports the correlation coefficients for monthly residuals from December 2000 to November 2015 of the short rate (EONIA), government bond spreads for France (FR), the Netherlands (NL), Italy (IT), and Spain (ES), corporate bond spreads for AAA-, AA-, A-, and BBB-rated bonds, stocks, and real estate returns, after fitting to the short rate and spreads to Ornstein-Uhlenbeck processes and stocks and real estate returns to geometric Brownian motions.

| | EONIA | Spread (FR) | Spread (NL) | Spread (IT) | Spread (ES) | Spread (AAA) | Spread (AA) | Spread (A) | Spread (BBB) | Stocks | Real Estate |
|--------------|--------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|--------------|-------------|------------|--------------|--------|-------------|
| EONIA | 1 | -0.114 | -0.133 | -0.103 | -0.072 | -0.073 | 0.052 | 0.039 | -0.112 | 0.135 | 0.274 |
| Spread (FR) | -0.114 | 1 | 0.535 | 0.67 | 0.629 | 0.136 | 0.267 | 0.284 | 0.253 | -0.174 | -0.203 |
| Spread (NL) | -0.133 | 0.535 | 1 | 0.489 | 0.518 | 0.278 | 0.311 | 0.33 | 0.368 | -0.243 | -0.27 |
| Spread (IT) | -0.103 | 0.67 | 0.489 | 1 | 0.81 | 0.142 | 0.277 | 0.296 | 0.293 | -0.21 | -0.196 |
| Spread (ES) | -0.072 | 0.629 | 0.518 | 0.81 | 1 | 0.154 | 0.242 | 0.252 | 0.231 | -0.147 | -0.141 |
| Spread (AAA) | -0.073 | 0.136 | 0.278 | 0.142 | 0.154 | 1 | 0.81 | 0.773 | 0.637 | -0.095 | -0.032 |
| Spread (AA) | 0.052 | 0.267 | 0.311 | 0.277 | 0.242 | 0.81 | 1 | 0.965 | 0.819 | -0.216 | -0.08 |
| Spread (A) | 0.039 | 0.284 | 0.33 | 0.296 | 0.252 | 0.773 | 0.965 | 1 | 0.884 | -0.303 | -0.179 |
| Spread (BBB) | -0.112 | 0.253 | 0.368 | 0.293 | 0.231 | 0.637 | 0.819 | 0.884 | 1 | -0.438 | -0.342 |
| Stocks | 0.135 | -0.174 | -0.243 | -0.21 | -0.147 | -0.095 | -0.216 | -0.303 | -0.438 | 1 | 0.663 |
| Real Estate | 0.274 | -0.203 | -0.27 | -0.196 | -0.141 | -0.032 | -0.08 | -0.179 | -0.342 | 0.663 | 1 |

Figure IA.4. Financial Market Dynamics: Historical and Simulated.


The figures depicts one exemplary simulated path and the 25th / 75th percentiles of simulated 10-year German government bond rates, AAA corporate bond rates, and the European stock market index from year 0 on. Prior to year 0, we show the actual historical evolution, up to year 0, which corresponds to 2015. Figure (a) is based on all simulated paths and Figure (b) is based only on those with the 5% largest average increase in the 10-year German government bond rate.



E Surrender Payouts and Consumption

Figure IA.5. Correlation Between Surrender Payouts and Private Consumption.


The figure plots the logarithm of annual aggregate surrender payouts (x-axis) and the logarithm of total private consumption expenditures (y-axis) in Germany from 1996 to 2019 as scatter points. A univariate regression implies that consumption expenditures increase by 0.65% when surrender payouts rise by 1%. *Sources: BaFin (surrender payouts), OECD (private consumption expenditures).*



F Surrenders and Equity and Debt Issuance

Figure IA.6. Correlation Between Surrender Rates and Equity and Debt Issuance.

The figure shows a binned scatter plot of the annual surrender rate (x-axis) and the (a) total equity and (b) total debt issuance (y-axis) of German life insurers at the insurer-by-year level from 2007 to 2019 after absorbing timeinvariant variation using insurer fixed effects. Equity and debt issuance are scaled by lagged gross premiums written. We exclude insurers that never issued (a) equity or (b) debt during this period, with 106 insurers remaining. *Sources: Erstversicherungsstatistik (surrender rates), S&P Capital IQ (equity and debt issuance).*



G Additional Simulation Results: Market Value Adjustments

Market value adjustments (MVAs), commonly found in U.S. deferred multiyear annuities (see Internet Appendix A), adjust surrender values for interest rate changes: an increase in interest rates reduces market-value-adjusted surrender values, everything else being equal.

We implement an MVA to examine how it affects surrender rates and asset sales. For this purpose, we use the same initial balance sheet calibration as in the baseline analysis but assume that, starting at $t = 0$, all cohorts' surrender values are subject to an MVA. The market-value-adjusted surrender value at year-begin $t, t \geq 1$, is $sv_{t-1,MVA}^h = (1 - mva_{t-1}^h) \cdot \vartheta \cdot v_{t-1}^h$, where mva_{t-1}^h is the MVA factor. Whereas an MVA may be implemented in various ways, we base the definition of the MVA factor on that most commonly found in the U.S.:

$$mva_{t-1}^h = 1 - \min \left\{ \left(\frac{1 + \tilde{r}_{P,t-1}^h}{1 + \ell + r_{f,t-1,T^h-(t-1)}} \right)^{T-(t-1)}, \vartheta^{-1} \right\}. \quad (\text{IA.9})$$

If $mva_{t-1}^h = 0$, then there is no MVA, and the policyholder receives the cash value less the surrender penalty. The larger mva_{t-1}^h , the smaller is the surrender payout. The minimum operator ensures that the MVA cannot overcompensate the surrender penalty, i.e., policyholders cannot receive more than the contract's cash value. ℓ adjusts the average level of mva_{t-1}^h , accounting for the spread on top of the risk-free rate earned by insurers. A low value of ℓ translates into a low average MVA factor, boosting surrender rates. We use $\ell = 0.0282$, which makes the initial average level of the surrender rate in our model comparable to that in the baseline calibration.

Figure [IA.7](#) shows the distribution of market value adjustment factors mva_{t-1}^h across cohorts and over time. Owing to rising interest rates, adjustment factors increase, depressing

adjusted surrender values.

Figure IA.7. Market Value Adjustment Factor.

The figure depicts the market value adjustment factor, as defined in Equation (IA.9). The figure shows the median and 25th/75th percentile for each year.






Figure IA.8 compares the surrender rates, durations, asset sales, and price impact in the counterfactual calibration with MVA to that in the baseline calibration.

Figure IA.8. Impact of MVAs.


Figures (a) and (b) depict the surrender rates and durations for the baseline calibration without MVAs and the counterfactual calibration with MVAs. Figures (c) and (d) depict the mean and 25th and 75th percentiles of the insurer's asset sales relative to the previous year's total assets for a constant surrender rate λ and a dynamic surrender rate λ (endogenously determined depending on the market environment) as well as the mean price impact per EUR 1 sold with a dynamic surrender rate λ , all with MVAs. We show the results for both the investment strategy with duration matching and that with fixed portfolio weights.




(a) Surrender rates.



(b) Duration of Liabilities.



(c) Asset sales and price impact (duration matching).



(d) Asset sales and price impact (fixed pf weights).

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